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ARTICLE
TAKE YOUR GUNS TO CHURCH:
THE SECOND AMENDMENT AND CHURCH AUTONOMY
Benjamin Boydt
And David said unto Ahimelech, And is there not here under
thine hand spear or sword? . . .And the priest said, The sword of
Goliath the Philistine, whom thou slewest in the valley of Elah,
behold, it is here wrapped in a cloth behind the ephod: if thou wilt
take that, take it: for there is no other save that here. And David
said, There is none like that; give it me.'
And to the captains over hundreds did the priest give king David's
spears and shields, that were in the temple of the LORD. And the
guard stood, every man with his weapons in his hand, round
about the king, from the right corner of the temple to the left
corner of the temple, along by the altar and the temple.2
I. INTRODUCTION: [DON'T] TAKE YOUR GUNS TO CHURCH3
In its colonial past, Georgia required men to take their guns to church.
Colonial Georgia had a law requiring that everyone eligible for militia
service who resorted
on any Sunday or other times, to any church, or other place of
divine worship within the parish where such person shall reside,
shall carry with him a gun, or a pair of pistols, in good order and
fit for service, with at least six charges of gun-powder and ball,
and shall take the said gun or pistols with him to the pew or seat,
t Staff Attorney to Chief Justice Roy S. Moore, Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme
Court. Special thanks to Matthew Clark, Lael Weinberger, Benjamin Walton, Melanie
Migliaccio, and the Hon. Keith Kautz for their patient listening, advice, and assistance with
this article. A very special thanks to Mrs. Sheryl Boyd, and to Gloriana, Zion, Jamin, and
Calvin, who are five good reasons to take a gun to church. Most of all, grateful praise to the
King, Jesus Christ. @ 2014 Benjamin Boyd; LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW.
1. 1 Samuel 21:8-9 (King James) (emphasis added).
2. 2 Kings 11:10-11 (King James) (emphasis added).
3. To turn Johnny Cash's phrase: "Don't take your guns to [church], son. Leave your
guns at home, Bill. Don't take your guns to [church]." JOHNNY CASH, DON'T TAKE YOUR
GUNS To TowN (Columbia Records 1958).
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where such person shall sit, remain, or be, within or about the
said church or place of worship[.]4
Men who did not comply faced a small fine.s The colonial law required
church wardens, deacons, and elders "to examine all such male persons, at
any time after the congregation is assembled, on Christmas and Easter days,
and at least twelve other times in every year" as to whether "persons liable
to bear arms" "to places of public worship" appeared there "without the
arms and ammunition by this act directed."6 Church leaders who neglected
this duty faced a sizeable fine.7 The times, however, have changed indeed.
Today, if one carries "a gun, or pair of pistols" into a church in Georgia, he
commits a misdemeanor.' However, if a concealed-carry licensee
approaches church security or management upon arrival, the misdemeanor
punishment does not apply if he or she "notifies such security or
management personnel of the presence of the weapon or long gun and
explicitly follows the security or management personnel's direction for
removing, securing, storing, or temporarily surrendering such weapon or
long gun[.]"' Some of our forefathers were required to bears arms in
church. What was once required is now prohibited, and some of our
forefathers' descendants must disarm themselves in church. 0
This Article focuses on the tensions between weapon laws aimed at the
Church" on the one hand and the jurisdictional autonomy of the Church
and constitutional protections of the Church and Church members on the
other. 2 This Article contends that the State lacks both the jurisdictional and
constitutional authority to regulate weapons in the Church. As a solution to
4. 19 COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA 138 (Allen D. Candler ed., 1911),
available at http://books.google.com/books?id=bgMMAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&source
=gbs-ge-summaryr&cad=0#v-onepage&q&6-false. At the time, the militia was limited to white
males. Id.
5. Id. The fine was ten shillings. Id.
6. Id. at 139.
7. Id.
8. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(b)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
9. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(d)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
10. JOHNNY CASH, supra note 3.
11. This article uses "Church" in its corporate sense as the catholic, or universal, body of
Christ composed of various local church assemblies and the members thereof in these
United States.
12. This article does not question the lawfulness of statutes that require eligible men to
be prepared for militia service, but does question the propriety of the State enforcing militia
laws in the Church (as a place for gathering the militia).
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the State's regulation of weapons in the Church, this Article proposes that
the Church and churchgoers must challenge such statutes through the
Church's autonomous jurisdiction and also through the First and Second
Amendments.
This Article begins by surveying the problem: weapon laws aimed at the
Church. Then, as to the Church's jurisdiction, this Article explains the
historical and legal basis of the jurisdictional separation of Church and
State, known as church autonomy. Second, this Article surveys the biblical
basis for church autonomy, the views of Madison and Jefferson on church
autonomy, and United States Supreme Court precedent on church
autonomy. Third, this Article examines the central location of church
autonomy-the sanctuary. This Article surveys the privilege of sanctuary,
biblical sanctuary law, the common law privilege of sanctuary, the abolition
of ecclesiastical sanctuary, and the rise of statist sanctuary laws. Then, this
Article proposes a jurisdictional solution: apply the principles of church
autonomy to the specific weapon laws aimed at the Church.
As to the Church's and churchgoers' constitutional protections, this
Article first considers whether constitutional challenges to weapon laws
aimed at the Church are plausible in light of GeorgiaCarry.Org v. Georgia, a
recent federal court decision on the subject. Second, this Article argues that
weapon laws aimed at churches violate the plain text and history of the
Second Amendment and proposes how to frame a Second Amendment
challenge to such laws. Third, this Article argues alternatively that under
current United States Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence, a
successful Free Exercise Clause challenge to such statutes may be made
under both rational-basis review and strict-scrutiny review.
In conclusion, this Article proposes how to frame a biblical defense of
armed self-defense in the Church. This biblical defense of armed self-
defense in the Church applies with equal force to each of the jurisdictional
and constitutional solutions proposed in this Article.
II. THE PROBLEMS: WEAPON LAWS AIMED AT CHURCHES
A. Total Weapon Bans and Concealed-Carry Bans
North Dakota regulates the Church with a near-complete ban on
firearms. North Dakota law provides: "[a]n individual who possesses a
firearm ... at a public gathering is guilty of a class B misdemeanor." The
13. N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-05(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
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statute makes no distinction between open carry and concealed carry. For
the purpose of this section, "'public gathering' includes ... churches or
church functions[.]"" The statute does not affect armed security officers, for
the local churches that may have security officers." In addition, North
Dakota's political subdivisions may enact firearms ordinances that are "less
restrictive than this section relating to the possession of firearms .. . at a
public gathering,"'6 thus allowing North Dakota's ban on firearms at
churches or church functions to be lifted on a county-wide or city-wide
basis.
Michigan, Missouri, and South Carolina regulate the Church with
blanket bans on concealed-carry in church but permit local church leaders
to authorize concealed-carry at their discretion." An Arkansas concealed
handgun license does not "authorize[] any person to carry a concealed
handgun into ... [a]ny church or other place of worship."" A Mississippi
concealed weapons license does not "authorize any person to carry a stun
gun, concealed pistol or revolver into ... any church or other place of
14. Id.
15. N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-05(2) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.). This
statute does not apply to "[p]rivate security personnel while on duty." Id. The easy
solution-short of a lawsuit for a declaratory judgment, which would be costly-for North
Dakota's ban on weapons at church and church functions is for local churches to deputize
some of their members as church security officers.
16. N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-05(3) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
17. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 28.425o(1)(e) (West, Westlaw through 2013
Legis. Sess.) ("[A]n individual licensed ... to carry a concealed pistol ... shall not carry a
concealed pistol on the premises of ... [any property or facility owned or operated by a
church, synagogue, mosque, temple, or other place of worship, unless the presiding official
or officials ... permit the carrying of concealed pistol on that property or facility."); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 571.107(1)(14) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Ex. Sess.) (A Missouri concealed
weapons endorsement does not authorize the licensee to carry concealed firearms into:
"[any church or other place of religious worship without the consent of the minister or
person or persons representing the religious organization that exercises control over the
place of religious worship."); S.C. CODE. ANN. § 23-31-215(M)(9) (West, Westlaw through
2013 Legis. Sess.) (A South Carolina concealed weapons permit "does not authorize a permit
holder to carry a concealable weapon into a ... church or other established religious
sanctuary unless express permission is given by the appropriate church official or governing
body[.]"); WY. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-104(t)(viii) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.)
(Wyoming law forbids those "authorized to carry a concealed weapon ... [to] carry a
concealed firearm into ... [any place where persons are assembled for public worship,
without the written consent of the chief administrator of that place").
18. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-73-306(16) (West, Westlaw through 2013 1st Ex. Sess.).
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worship."" A Nebraska concealed weapon "permitholder may carry a
concealed handgun anywhere in Nebraska, except any ... place of
worship."2
B. Louisiana: Regulations for Church Government
Louisiana's concealed-carry statute regulates the Church by providing
that "[n]o concealed handgun may be carried into and no concealed
handgun permit issued pursuant to this Section shall authorize or entitle a
permittee to carry a concealed handgun in ... [a]ny church, synagogue,
mosque, or other similar place of worship ... except as provided for in
Subsection U of this Section."2 ' Subsection U provides that:
[t]he entity which owns the business or has authority over the
administration of a church, synagogue, or mosque shall have the
authority to authorize any person issued a valid concealed
handgun permit ... to carry a concealed handgun in the church,
synagogue, or mosque.22
Louisiana places additional regulations upon the Church where a local
church authorizes persons to carry a concealed handgun in the sanctuary.
First, if the church authorizes the carrying of concealed handguns, the
leader of the church must inform the congregation of this authorization.23
Second, if a church authorizes concealed carry, the place of worship must
require "an additional eight hour tactical training for those persons wishing
to carry concealed handguns in the church .... The training shall be
conducted annually."24
C. Georgia: A Weapons Ban or Regulation of Church Government?
Georgia's carry law regulates the Church by providing that: "[a] person
shall be guilty of carrying a weapon ... in an unauthorized location ...
when he or she carries a weapon ... [i]n a place of worship[.]"2 5 However,
this penalty does not apply:
19. MIss. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(13) (West, Westlaw through 2013 2d Ex. Sess.).
20. NEB. REv. ST. ANN. § 69-2441(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Leg. Sess.).
21. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(N)(8) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
22. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(U)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
23. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(U)(3) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
24. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(U)(5) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
25. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(b)(4) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
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[to a license holder who approaches security or management
personnel upon arrival... and notifies such security or
management personnel of the presence of the weapon or long
gun and explicitly follows the security or management
personnel's direction for removing, securing, storing, or
temporarily surrendering such weapon or long gun[.]26
Georgia's current statute was amended in 2010. The original senate bill
would have allowed weapons to be carried in churches. Many Georgia
churches advocated for this freedom after finding that Georgia's old "Public
Gathering Law" limited the Church's power to control the possession of
firearms on local church property.27 However, Georgia's House Committee
on the Judiciary changed the senate's original intent and made it a violation
to carry a weapon into a church and also "remove[d] the discretion given to
presiding officials of places of worship to permit carrying. "28 The
Conference Committee on the bill reinserted an earlier provision allowing a
concealed-carry licensee to approach security personnel in churches.29
Hudson and Adams opined that "[t]he Act [] establishes that guns may not
be carried in places of worship."3o
However, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals had another reading of
Georgia's statute and opined that "[t]he plain language of the Carry Law
belies any argument that all firearms are per se prohibited from a place of
worship; quite simply, this is not the 'ban' that Plaintiffs make it out to
be."" The federal judges reasoned, "[b]ecause a place of worship is private
property, not public property, it is particularly important that we
understand the individual right to bear arms in light of. . .property law; for
that body of law establishes the rights of private property owners."32 The
panel of judges stated that:
26. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(d)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
27. Danielle Hudson & Sara Adams, Crimes and Offenses, 27 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 131,
137-38 (2010). Hudson and Adams detail the legislative history for Georgia's Code section
16-11-127.
28. Id. at 140-41. Hudson and Adams indicated that this was a "compromise" in order
to "get something done." Id. at 142.
29. Id. at 145.
30. Id. at 146 (emphasis added).
31. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. State of Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1261 n.36 (11th Cir.
2012).
32. Id. at 1261.
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"[T]he Second Amendment does not include protection for a
right to carry a firearm in a place of worship against the owner's
wishes. Quite simply, there is no constitutional infirmity when a
private property owner exercises his, her, or its-in the case of a
place of worship-right to control who may enter, and whether
that invited guest can be armed, and the State vindicates that
right."33
If the Eleventh Circuit's reading of this statute is correct, then Georgia's
carry law is not a complete ban; the statute merely regulates the Church,
rather than preempting the Church's decisions. The Eleventh Circuit's
reading, however, does not do justice to the plain text of the statute or the
legislative history. If Georgia's law deferred to the jurisdictional autonomy
and the private property rights of the Church, the statutory language would
make that clear" and permit the Church to authorize the presence of
weapons in the sanctuary.35
D. Statutes That Indirectly Ban Weapons in the Church
1. Church Schools and Parochial Schools
Many weapon laws aimed at protecting school children and teachers
effectively ban weapons at church schools and parochial schools, thus
indirectly regulating weapons in the Church. In Arizona, a person commits
criminal misconduct when he knowingly possesses "a deadly weapon on
school grounds," 6 which includes "a public or nonpublic kindergarten
33. Id. at 1264.
34. The Code of Georgia prohibits concealed-carry "[i]n a bar, unless the owner of the
bar permits the carrying of weapons or long guns by license holders." GA CODE ANN. 5 16-11-
127(b)(6) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.) (emphasis added). Subsection (b)(4)
does not have this language, but the Eleventh Circuit essentially read (b)(4) into (b)(6) to
come up with the whole property rights analysis.
35. Cf. W. VA. CODE § 61-7-14 (West, Westlaw through 2013 1st Extraordinary Sess.)
("[Any owner, lessee or other person charged with the care, custody and control of real
property may prohibit the carrying openly or concealing of any firearm or deadly weapon on
property under his or her domain[.]" If concealed or open carry is prohibited, "[a]ny person
carrying or possessing a firearm or other deadly weapon on the property of another" has the
option of (1) temporarily relinquishing possession of the firearm upon being requested to do
so or (2) leaving the premises. Id.
36. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(A)(12) (West, Westlaw through 1st Legis. Sess. of
51st Legislature).
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program, common school or high school."" An Arkansas carry permit does
not entitle the person to "carry a concealed handgun [into] ... [a] school,
college, community college, or university campus building or event, unless
for the purpose of participating in an authorized firearms-related activity.""
Delaware provides that a person who carries a concealed deadly weapon
"while in or on a 'Safe School and Recreation Zone"' is guilty of a felony."
The District of Columbia declares certain areas "gun free zones," which
include:
All areas within, 1000 feet of an appropriately identified public or
private day care center, elementary school, vocational school,
secondary school, college, junior college, or university, or any
public swimming pool, playground, video arcade, youth center,
or public library . . . or an event sponsored by any of the above
entities[J'
A Florida carry license "does not authorize any person to openly carry a
handgun or carry a concealed weapon or firearm into ... [a]ny elementary
or secondary school facility."4'
Georgia law states, "it shall be unlawful for any person to carry to or to
possess or have under such person's control while within a school safety
zone or at a school building, school function, or school property ... any
weapon[.]" 42 "School safety zone" is:
[Iln or on any real property owned by or leased to any public or
private elementary school, secondary school, or school board and
used for elementary or secondary education and in or on the
campus of any public or private technical school, vocational
37. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-3102(M)(4) (West, Westlaw through 1st Legis. Sess. of
51st Legislature).
38. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 5-73-306(14) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
39. 11 DEL. CODE ANN. § 1457(a); (b)(1)-(2) (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 2013, chs.
1-185). "Safe School and Recreation Zone" includes any building, structure or real property
owned, operated, leased or rented by any public or private school from the kindergarten level
up to university, within 1000 feet of such building, structure, or real property. 11 DEL. CODE
ANN. § 1457(c)(1) (West, Westlaw through 79 Laws 2013, chs. 1-185).
40. D.C. CODE § 22-4502.01(a) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013).
41. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.06(12)(a)(10) (West, Westlaw through 1st 2013 Legis. Sess. of
23d Legislature).
42. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
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school, college, university, or institution of postsecondary
education.43
Illinois recently passed the Firearm Concealed Carry Act, HBO173," which
enjoins carrying weapons into any private school, public school, pre-
schools, 5 colleges and universities." Maine law provides: "A person may
not possess a firearm on public school property or the property of an
approved private school or discharge a firearm within 500 feet of public
school property or the property of an approved private school."47 A
Mississippi carry permit does not authorize carrying a concealed pistol into
"any elementary or secondary school facility; any junior college, community
college, college or university facility."4
A Nebraska carry permit does not authorize concealed-carry into any:
[B]uilding, grounds, vehicle, or sponsored activity or athletic
event of any public, private, denominational, or parochial
elementary, vocational, or secondary school, a private
postsecondary career school ... a community college, or a public
or private college, junior college, or university."
New Mexico's carry law does not authorize a licensee "to carry a concealed
handgun on school premises."so North Carolina provides a felony "for any
person knowingly to possess or carry, whether openly or concealed, any
gun, rifle, pistol, or other firearm of any kind on educational property or to
a curricular or extracurricular activity sponsored by a school,"" which is
any "public or private school, community college, college, or university."52
North Dakota provides a misdemeanor for "an individual who possesses a
43. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127.1(a)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
44. Illinois General Assembly, HB0183, §1 (2013), available at http://www.ilga.gov/
legislation/98/HB/PDF/09800HB01831v.pdf.
45. Id. § 65(a)(1)-(2).
46. Id. § 65(a)(15).
47. ME. REV. STAT. 20-A, § 6552(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 1st Legis. Sess. & 1st
Special Legis. Sess.).
48. MIss. CODE ANN. § 45-9-101(13) (West, Westlaw through 2013 2d Ex. Sess.).
49. NEB. REv. ST. ANN. § 69-2441(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
50. N. M. STAT. ANN. § 29-19-8(B) (West, Westlaw through Ist Legis. Sess. of 51st
Legislature).
51. N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-269.2(b) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
52. N.C. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 14-269.2(a)(1b) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
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firearm ... at a public gathering,"53 which includes "schools or school
functions."-
Pennsylvania law states that "[a] person commits a misdemeanor of the
first degree if he possesses a weapon in the buildings of, on the grounds of
... any elementary or secondary private school ... or any elementary or
secondary parochial school."5 South Dakota provides a misdemeanor for
the person who intentionally carries any firearm "on or in any elementary
or secondary school premises, vehicle, or building or any premises, vehicle,
or building used or leased for elementary or secondary school functions."5 6
West Virginia law provides that:
It is unlawful for a person to possess a firearm or other deadly
weapon on a school bus ... or in or on any public or private
primary or secondary education building, structure, facility or
grounds ... or at any school-sponsored function.
In Maryland, "[a] person may not carry or possess a firearm, knife, or
deadly weapon of any kind on public school property."58
2. Church Daycares and Church Pre-Schools
Many states' weapon laws regulate churches that have day care centers,
childcare centers, and preschools on or adjacent to their properties.
Weapon statutes aimed at protecting such facilities effectively ban and/or
regulate weapons in the churches that house these ministries. Alaska law
provides that "[a] person commits the crime of misconduct involving
weapons in the fifth degree if the person" knowingly possesses a firearm
"within the grounds of or on a parking lot immediately adjacent to an
entity, other than a private residence, licensed as a child care facility ... for
the care of children."5' District of Columbia law protects "[a]ll areas
within[] 1000 feet of an appropriately identified public or private day care
53. N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-05(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
54. Id.
55. 18 PA. CONs. STAT. § 912(B) (West, Westlaw through 2013-72 Legis. Sess.).
56. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 13-32-7 (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
57. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-1la(b)(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 1st Extraordinary
Sess.).
58. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 4-102(b) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
59. ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.61.220(a)(4)(A) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.)
(emphasis added).
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center" as gun free zones.' The new Illinois carry law enjoins concealed-
carry in any "pre-school or child care facility, including any room or
portion of a building under the control of a pre-school or child care
facility."' The New Mexico carry law does not allow "a licensee ... to carry
.. . on the premises of a preschool."6 Michigan's carry law provides that "an
individual licensed under this act to carry a concealed pistol ... shall not
carry a concealed pistol on the premises of ... [a] public or private child
care center or day care center, public or private child caring institution, or
public or private child placing agency. "6' A South Carolina concealed carry
permit does not authorize concealed-carry in a "daycare facility or pre-
school facility."'
Having surveyed the state weapon laws that are aimed at the Church, this
Article now surveys key aspects of the jurisdictional separation of Church
and State, known as church autonomy.
III. THE HISTORICAL AND LEGAL BASIS FOR CHURCH AUTONOMY
A. Why Address the Church's Jurisdiction First?
This Article addresses jurisdiction first, rather than the Constitution. The
reasons are simple. Church government is distinct from civil government,
and, thus, their respective jurisdictions are distinct. The Westminster
Confession of Faith states, "The Lord Jesus, as King and Head of His church,
hath therein appointed a government, in the hand of church officers, distinctfrom the civil magistrate."" The fact that church government is distinct
from the civil magistrate operates to limit the jurisdiction of the state or
civil magistrate:
60. D.C. CODE § 22-4502.01(a) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013).
61. Illinois General Assembly, HB0183, § 65(a)(2) (2013).
62. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 29-19-8(C) (West, Westlaw through 1st Sess. of 51st Legislature).
63. MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 28.425o(1)(b) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
As applied to the Church, this section conflicts with subsection (e), which permits
concealed-carry in church and on "[a]ny property or facility owned or operated by a...
place of worship" if the presiding officials permit concealed-carry. MIcH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
28.425o(1)(e) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
64. S.C. CODE ANN. § 23-31-215(M)(7) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
However, South Carolina allows concealed-carry in the Church upon "express permission is
given by the appropriate church official or governing body. S.C. CODE ANN. 5 23-31-215(9)
(West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
65. Westminster Confession ofFaith, XXX(1) (Rev. ed. 1960) (emphasis added).
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Civil magistrates may not assume to themselves the
administration of the word and sacraments; or the power of the
keys of the kingdom of heaven; or, in the least, interfere in
matters of faith.... And, as Jesus Christ hath appointed a regular
government and discipline in his church, no law of any
commonwealth should interfere with, let, or hinder, the due
exercise thereof, among the voluntary members of any
denomination of Christians, according to their own profession
and belief. It is the duty of civil magistrates to protect the person
and good name of all their people, in such an effectual manner as
that no person be suffered, either upon pretense of religion or
infidelity, to offer any indignity, violence, abuse, or injury to any
other person whatsoever: and to take order, that all religious and
ecclesiastical assemblies be held without molestation or
disturbance.6
As the Church and State are distinct, the State's courts lack jurisdiction
over the decisions of church government. If the courts lack jurisdiction over
church government, the court has no authority to call into question the
Church's decisions regarding church security and weapons possession in
the sanctuary. This is so because no law of any commonwealth should
interfere with the "due exercises" and "regular government" of the Church.
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution recognizes that the
Church has "an independence from secular control or manipulation, in
short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters
of church government as well as those of faith and doctrine."6 ' Because of the
Church's freedom in matters of faith, doctrine, and the decisions of church
government, church autonomy is an affirmative defense the Church may
raise with a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.68 Thus,
66. Id. at XXIII(3) (emphasis added).
67. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S.
94, 116 (1952) (emphasis added).
68. Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colorado, 289 F.3d 648, 654 (10th Cir.
2002) ("St. Aidan's Church raised the church autonomy defense on a motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The motion would more appropriately be considered as a
challenge to the sufficiency of plaintiffs claims under Rule 12(b)(6). If the church autonomy
doctrine applies to the statements and materials on which plaintiffs have based their claims,
then the plaintiffs have no claim for which relief may be granted. In this sense, the assertion
that the First Amendment precludes the sexual harassment suit is similar to a government
official's defense of qualified immunity, which is frequently asserted in a motion to dismiss
under Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 56.").
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where state courts lack jurisdiction over issues regarding decisions of the
government of the Church concerning church security and weapons in the
church, a successful motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction precludes the
court from addressing any substantive statutory and constitutional issues.
B. The Bible and Church Autonomy: "It Appertaineth Not Unto Thee!"
The jurisdictional separation of Church and State runs deep in the
Western legal tradition. These roots are thoroughly biblical-and thus, this
Article focuses first on the Bible.69 The jurisdictional separation of Church
and State grew and flourished in the ancient Hebrew republic, which
separated the civil duties of the judges and elders from the religious duties
of the priests and Levites. 0 The Hebrew republic also separated the civil
jurisdiction of the kings from the religious jurisdiction of the priests and
Levites.'
Kings such as Saul and Uzziah who transgressed the jurisdictional
boundary between Church and State under biblical law were severely
sanctioned for their usurpation.72 The priests who withstood King Uzziah
bravely spoke these words that memorialize the jurisdictional separation of
Church and State: "And they withstood Uzziah the king, and said unto him,
It appertaineth not unto thee, Uzziah, to burn incense unto the LORD, but to
the priests the sons of Aaron, that are consecrated to burn incense: go out of
the sanctuary; for thou hast trespassed, neither shall it be for thine honor
from the LORD God."73 King Ahab and Queen Jezebel of the Northern
Kingdom of Israel also flagrantly departed from the separation of Church
69. A complete survey of the development of this doctrine is beyond the scope of this
Article, and has been covered amply by others. See generally, Robert J. Renaud & Lael D.
Weinberger, Spheres of Sovereignty: Church Autonomy Doctrine and the Theological Heritage
of the Separation of Church and State, 35 N. KY. L. REV. 67, 69-84 (2008); RENAUD &
WEINBERGER, A TALE OF Two GOVERNMENTS: CHURCH DISCIPLINE, THE COURTS, AND THE
SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE (2012). See also Ex parte G.C., 924 So. 2d 651, 674-77
(Ala. 2005) (Parker, J., dissenting); Yates v. El Bethel Primitive Baptist Church, 847 So. 2d
331, 349-58 (Ala. 2002) (Moore, C.J., dissenting). See generally, Hon. Roy S. Moore, Religion
in the Public Square, 29 CUMB. L. REv. 347 (1999).
70. Exodus 18:13-26 (elders/judges); Deuteronomy 16:18-22 (judges); Exodus 28:1
(priests). See also Benjamin S. Walton, The Authoritativeness and Usefulness of the Principles
of God's Old Covenant Law for the New Covenant Church and State, 5 LIBERTY U.L. REV. 419,
454-58 (2011).
71. Deuteronomy 17:14-20 (kings); Deuteronomy 18:1-8 (Levites).
72. 1 Samuel 13:9-14 (King Saul); 2 Chronicles 26:16-21 (King Uzziah).
73. 2 Chronicles 26:18 (King James).
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and State required by God's law." Ahab and Jezebel unified the State and
Church through pagan Baal worship, for the prophets of Baal were
ministers of state, supported by Jezebel, rather than ministers of an
independent jurisdiction."
Jesus Christ later enforced this jurisdictional separation when He taught
that His disciples should "[r]ender therefore unto Caesar the things which
are Caesar's; and unto God the things which are God's."7 6 During the
Roman era, the Apostles confirmed the separate jurisdiction of Christ's
church from the state, a doctrine that "turned the world upside down,"" for
the apostles "all do contrary to the decrees of Caesar, saying that there is
another king, one Jesus."" Nonetheless, the Apostles taught and encouraged
submission to the ruling civil authorities," while affirming the jurisdictional
separation of Church and State. The Apostles taught and maintained that in
certain areas "[w] e ought to obey God rather than men."so
From these biblical foundations, the jurisdictional separation of the
Church, or the religious realm, from the State passed from the bosom of the
early Church into the Common Law well before the Magna Carta and much
later into the colonial American landscape.' Significantly, the first Article
of the Magna Carta confirmed the jurisdictional separation of Church and
State, "the church of England is to be free,"82 enshrining the biblical
principle that there are certain things that "appertaineth not unto" the civil
magistrate.
C. The Founding Fathers: James Madison and Thomas Jefferson
The jurisdictional separation of Church and State in the United States
has been memorialized by the writings of James Madison and Thomas
74. 1 Kings 16:29-33 (King James).
75. 1 Kings 18:19 (King James) ("the prophets of Baal four hundred and fifty, and the
prophets of the groves four hundred, which eat at Jezebel's table").
76. Matthew 22:21 (King James).
77. Acts 17:6 (King James).
78. Acts 17:7 (King James).
79. 1 Peter 2:13-17; 1 Timothy 2:1-3.
80. Acts 5:29 (King James).
81. See generally, Renaud & Weinberger, supra note 69, at 72-83.
82. See, Magna Carta at § 1 (1215), available at www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured
documents/magnacarta/tanslation.html ("In the first place we grant to God and confirm by
this our present charter for ourselves and our heirs in perpetuity that the English Church is
to be free and to have all its rights fully and its liberties entirely.").
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Jefferson. Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance,83 addressed to the
General Assembly of Virginia, clearly advocated the jurisdictional
separation of Church and State. Madison wrote:
We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's right is
abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that Religion is wholly
exempt from its cognizance....
Because Religion be exempt from the authority of the Society at
large, still less can it be subject to that of the Legislative Body.
The latter are but the creatures and viceregents of the former.
Their jurisdiction is both derivative and limited: it is limited with
regard to the co-ordinate departments, more necessarily is it
limited with regard to the constituents.84
And further:
The preservation of a free Government requires not merely,
that the metes and bounds which separate each department of
power be invariably maintained; but more especially that neither
of them be suffered to overleap the great Barrier which defends
the rights of the people. The Rulers who are guilty of such an
encroachment, exceed the commission from which they derive
their authority, and are Tyrants. The People who submit to it are
governed by laws made neither by themselves nor by an
authority derived from them, and are slaves.
[We remonstrate blecause it is proper to take alarm at the
first experiment on our liberties."
Thus, Madison held that religion was "wholly exempt" from the
"cognizance" or jurisdiction of the State; religion is not subject to the
legislative body of the State; religion is a "separate department of power;"
and thus only tyrants would overleap the jurisdictional barriers, the "metes
and bounds" that separate the Church or religion from the State.
Thomas Jefferson, the author of the Virginia Statute for Religious
Freedom, wrote,
83. James Madison, A Memorial and Remonstrance to the General Assembly of Virginia
(1785) in GARY AMos & RICHARD GARDINER, NEVER BEFORE IN HISTORY: AMERICA'S INSPIRED
BIRTH 167-70 (2011).
84. Id. at 167-68.
85. Id. at 168.
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"Well aware: that Almighty God has created the mind free; that
all attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or burdens
or by civil incapacitations, tend only to .... [produce] habits of
hypocrisy and meanness ....
... no man shall ... otherwise suffer on account of his religious
opinions or belief; but that all men shall be free to profess ...
their opinion in matters of religion, and that the same shall in no
wise diminish, enlarge, or affect their civil capacities."86
Thomas Jefferson's language has been echoed through the years in some
state constitutions. Rhode Island's Constitution provides that:
[N]o person shall be compelled to frequent or to support any
religious worship, place, or ministry whatever, except in
fulfillment of such person's voluntary contract; nor enforced,
restrained, molested, or burdened in body or goods; nor
disqualified from holding any office; nor otherwise suffer on
account of such person's religious belief; and that every person
shall be free to worship God according to the dictates of such
person's conscience, and to profess and by argument to maintain
such person's opinion in matters of religion; and that the same
shall in no wise diminish, enlarge, or affect the civil capacity of
any person."
Alabama's Declaration of Rights provides "that the civil rights, privileges,
and capacities of any citizen shall not be in any manner affected by his
religious principles."" South Dakota: "No person shall be denied any civil
or political right, privilege or position on account of his religious
opinions."" Illinois: "[N] o person shall be denied any civil or political right,
privilege or capacity, on account of his religious opinions.""o Iowa: "[N]o
86. Id. at 159-160 (quoting Thomas Jefferson, Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom
(1786)).
87. R.I. CONST. art. I, § 3.
88. ALA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
89. S.D. CONST. art 6, § 3. Section 3 continues, "but the liberty of conscience hereby
secured shall not be so construed as to excuse licentiousness, the invasion of the rights of
others, or justify practices inconsistent with the peace or safety of the state." Id.
90. ILu. CONST. art. I, § 3. Much like South Dakota's provision supra, Illinois's provision
continues: "but the liberty of conscience hereby secured shall not be construed to dispense
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person shall be deprived of any of his rights, privileges, or capacities . .. in
consequence of his opinions on the subject of religion."" Idaho: "The
exercise and enjoyment of religious faith and worship shall forever be
guaranteed; and no person shall be denied any civil or political right,
privilege, or capacity on account of his religious opinions."92 Michigan:
"The civil and political rights, privileges and capacities of no person shall be
diminished or enlarged on account of his religious belief."93
Justice Tom Parker of the Alabama Supreme Court summarized the
general perspective of the Founding Era: "[O]ur Founders thought in terms
of a plurality of governments-including individual government and the
covenantal governments of the family, the state, and the church-and not of
state government alone. Each of these governments possesses its own
exclusive jurisdiction of authority, constituting the original 'separation of
powers."'94 Further,
[T]he separation of powers among the spheres of governments is
of a higher order and greater significance than the separation of
powers within a particular sphere of government, as in the state
government's division into executive, legislative, and judicial
branches. Consequently, courts must recognize and uphold the
separation of powers among the various government spheres
even more diligently than they already recognize and uphold the
separation of powers within the state sphere of government.95
Likewise, the Texas Supreme Court concisely defined the jurisdictional
separation of church and stated: "At its core, the First Amendment
recognizes two spheres of sovereignty when deciding matters of
government and religion. The religion clauses are designed to 'prevent, as
far as possible, the intrusion of either [religion or government] into the
precincts of the other.'"' Justice Parker observed, "In modern times . . . the
governing jurisdiction that most often exceeds its proper authority by
with oaths or affirmations, excuse acts of licentiousness, or justify practices inconsistent with
the peace or safety of the State."
91. IOWA CONST. art. I, § 4.
92. IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 4.
93. MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4.
94. Exparte G.C., 924 So. 2d 651, 675 (Ala. 2005) (Parker, J., dissenting).
95. Id.
96. C.L. Westbrook, Jr. v. Penley, 231 S.W.3d 389, 395 (Tex. 2007) (alteration in
original) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.,602, 614 (1971)).
2014] 669
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
usurpation is not the individual, the family, or the church, but the state....
[W]e live in an age in which such usurpation is so widespread that it has
come to be commonly tolerated."9 7
D. The United States Supreme Court on Church Autonomy
Even though the State is the governing authority that most often usurps
its jurisdictional limits, the Supreme Court of the United States has
acknowledged the jurisdictional separation of Church and State for over
140 years. In the 1871 case Watson v. Jones," the Supreme Court stated:
[T]he rule of action which should govern the civil courts,
founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of church
and state under our system of laws ... is, that, whenever the
questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom,
or law have been decided by the highest of these church
judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the legal
tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as binding on
them, in their application to the case before them."
The Watson court explained further:
In this country the full and free right to entertain any religious
belief, to practice any religious principle, and to teach any
religious doctrine which does not violate the laws of morality and
property, and which does not infringe personal rights, is
conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is committed to
the support of no dogma, the establishment of no sect. The right
to organize voluntary religious associations to assist in the
expression and dissemination of any religious doctrine, and to
create tribunals for the decision of controverted questions of
faith within the association, and for the ecclesiastical government
of all the individual members, congregations, and officers within
the general association, is unquestioned. 10
97. Exparte G.C., 924 So. 2d at 677.
98. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
99. Id. at 727.
100. Id. at 728-729 (emphasis added). "Each of these large and influential bodies (to
mention no others, let reference be had to the Protestant Episcopal, the Methodist Episcopal,
and the Presbyterian churches), has a body of constitutional and ecclesiastical law of its own,
to be found in their written organic laws, their books of discipline, in their collections of
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In 1952, the Supreme Court cited the Watson case and reasoned that "[t]he
opinion radiates ... a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an
independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to
decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church
government as well as those of faith and doctrine."o' In 1976, the Supreme
Court explained that, "[ [in short, the First and Fourteenth Amendments
permit hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules and
regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals
for adjudicating disputes over these matters."'0 2
In the 2012 Hosanna-Tabor decision, the Supreme Court repeated, "the
First Amendment 'permit[s] hierarchical religious organizations to establish
their own rules and regulations for internal discipline and government, and
to create tribunals for adjudicating disputes over these matters."" 3 Justice
Thomas concurred in Hosanna-Tabor and enumerated the dangers that the
First Amendment protects the Church against:
[I]t is a significant burden on a religious organization to require
it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities
a secular court will consider religious. The line is hardly a bright
one, and an organization might understandably be concerned
that a judge would not understand its religious tenets and sense
of mission. Fear of potential liability might affect the way an
organization carried out what it understood to be its religious
mission. *
Justice Alito's concurring opinion in Hosanna-Tabor explained the potent
effects of church autonomy:
precedents, in their usage and customs, which as to each constitute a system of ecclesiastical
law and religious faith that tasks the ablest minds to become familiar with. It is not to be
supposed that the judges of the civil courts can be as competent in the ecclesiastical law and
religious faith of all these bodies as the ablest men in each are in reference to their own." Id.
at 729.
101. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S.
94, 116 (1952).
102. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for United States of America and Canada v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976).
103. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694, 705
(2012).
104. Id. at 711 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the
Church of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 336 (1987)).
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Throughout our Nation's history, religious bodies have been the
preeminent example of private associations that have "act[ed] as
critical buffers between the individual and the power of the
State." ... [I]t is easy to forget that the autonomy of religious
groups, both here in the United States and abroad, has often
served as a shield against oppressive civil laws. To safeguard this
crucial autonomy, we have long recognized that the Religion
Clauses protect a private sphere within which religious bodies
are free to govern themselves in accordance with their own
beliefs. The Constitution guarantees religious bodies
"independence from secular control or manipulation-in short,
power to decide for themselves, free from state interference,
matters of church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine.""os
One key way the Church has served as a shield against the State's oppressive
laws throughout history is through the privilege of sanctuary, which is an
aspect of church autonomy.
IV. THE KEY LOCATION OF CHURCH AUTONOMY: THE SANCTUARY
A. The Purpose of the Privilege of Sanctuary: A Check on the State
Sanctuary is based on the doctrine of church autonomy. Sanctuary is "an
assertion of an independent right, premised on natural and divine power, to
prevent imminent harm to whomever the Church chooses to grant
protection. The Church confronted the State when it was either unwilling
or unable to control the administration of criminal justice."'o6 A sanctuary
is "a consecrated place giving protection to those fleeing from justice or
persecution; or, the privilege of taking refuge in such consecrated place."o7
Former professor and scholar Michael Feeley has argued that "three
elements-person, place, [and] government check-constitute the heart of
the concept of sanctuary."" The first element is "[t]he representatives and
105. Id. at 712 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Roberta v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S.
609, 619 (1984); Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 116).
106. Michael Scott Feeley, Towards the Cathedral: Ancient Sanctuary Represented in the
American Context, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 801,810 (1990) (emphasis added).
107. 13 George C. Alston, Sanctuary, THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA (1912), available at
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/13430a.htm.
108. Feeley, supra note 106, at 802.
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ministers of God and His Church [who] kept the sanctuary. They shielded
those who sought protection based on an inherent and supernatural right to
do so."'0 9 The second is "[t]he site of sanctuary [which] was dedicated to the
divine[.]"" The third element, government check, meant that "Church
sanctuary stood independent of the State and defined the limit of earthly
vengeance.""' To Feeley's three elements, a fourth element must be added:
law. The rule of law is of central importance to the privilege of sanctuary:
Through its sanctuary power, the Church not only forced the
pursuers to halt their pursuit, preventing summary retaliation
against the accused, but also called the State to observe just
procedures in adjudicating alleged wrongdoers. Thus, Church
sanctuary served as a check on violence, a reproach and aid to a
State striving to establish the rule of law, and a stimulus to due
process and fair adjudication."'
Thus, the required elements of sanctuary are that the (1) representative of
the Church guards the (2) place of the sanctuary as a (3) government check,
based upon (4) the rule of law. However, sanctuary is not based on the rule
of law, abstractly considered. It is the rule of God's law that is essential to
any concept of sanctuary, for God's law gives the Church the independent
jurisdiction and higher authority to check the power of the State.
The late R.J. Rushdoony, a theologian and expert on Church-State issues,
makes this connection clear:
The church was a sanctuary, not merely because of its continuity
with Israel, but because it represented God's law, God's justice on
earth. Today, the modern state is an increasingly oppressive
tyranny. Only as the church becomes the voice of God's law and
a sanctuary against injustice can the power of the current tyranny
be broken." 3
Under biblical law, however, the privilege of sanctuary was not limited to
just a sacred place or consecrated site, as Feeley's second element indicates.
The privilege was also tied to common places called the cities of refuge,
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 802-03 (emphasis added).
113. RoUSAS JOHN RUSHDOONY, CHRISTIANITY AND THE STATE 61 (1986) (emphasis
added).
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whose elders and congregational assemblies provided sanctuary and
administered justice through the laws of God.
B. Sanctuary in Biblical Law: A Check on the State and the Family
The independent right or privilege of sanctuary has origins in biblical
law, even though Blackstone traced the privilege of sanctuary to "the
superstitious veneration ... paid to consecrated ground in the times of
popery.""' The Catholic Encyclopedia essentially agreed with Blackstone:
"The right of sanctuary was based on the inviolability attaching to things
sacred; and not, as some have held, on the example set by the Hebrew cities
of refuge.""' While Pope Leo I, who served from 440-461,16 gave papal
sanction to the privilege of sanctuary,"'7 the papacy did not invent
sanctuary. Indeed, religious sanctuary originated with the biblical cities of
refuge. "[I]t is clear that the asylum [or sanctuary] granted was religious; it
was tied to the life and death of the high priest, and it was related to the
altar.""'
Biblical law provided two types of religious sanctuary: the six cities of
refuge" and the altar of sacrifice, which was located first in the tabernacle
and later the temple. 20 At first glance, it appears that Biblical law
established a civil sanctuary in the six cities of refuge and an ecclesiastical or
religious sanctuary at the altar of sacrifice. However, aside from the separate
locations, the cities of refuge and the altar were both thoroughly religious
114. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *332.
115. Alston, supra note 107. Alston did not support his assertion that the biblical cities of
refuge were not concerned with "the inviolability attaching to things sacred."
116. 9 Johann Peter Kirsch, Pope St. Leo I (the Great), THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA
(1912), available at http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09154b.htm.
117. See Jorge L. Carro, Sanctuary: The Resurgence of an Age-Old Right or a Dangerous
Misinterpretation of an Abandoned Ancient Privilege?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 747, 753 (1986)
("The Church, through Leo I, confirmed the Code of Theodosius the Younger, adding the
provision that the church's representative examine those seeking asylum and take action on
the evidence produced.")
118. RuSHDOONY, supra note 113, at 58. See Numbers 35:28 ("Because he should have
remained in the city of his refuge until the death of the high priest: but after the death of the
high priest the slayer shall return into the land of his possession."); Exodus 21:14, ("But if a
man come presumptuously upon his neighbour, to slay him with guile; thou shalt take him
from mine altar, that he may die.").
119. Numbers 35:9-34.
120. Exodus 21:12-14.
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sanctuaries. Biblical scholar Matthew Henry offered this explanation of the
religious aspect of sanctuary of the cities of refuge:
They are said to sanctify these cities, that is the original word for
appointed, [Joshua 20:7]. Not that any ceremony was used to
signify the consecration of them, only they did by a public act of
court solemnly declare them cities of refuge, and as such sacred
to the honour of God, as the protector of exposed innocency. If
they were sanctuaries, it was proper to say they were sanctified.121
The sanctuary of the cities of refuge was administered by the elders1 22 and
congregational assembly of each designated city.'23 However, the cities of
refuge were all Levitical citiesl 2 4 -that is, they were assigned to the tribe of
Levi, the priests. Matthew Henry opined that this made the Levites "judges
in those cases" and "protectors to oppressed innocency.""' The sanctuary of
the altar was administered by the priests who ministered at the altar, who
were also of the priestly tribe of Levi.126 Both types of sanctuary were
regulated by God's law regarding murder and capital punishment.127
Moreover, sanctuary "applied only to the man involved in an accidental
death in which he had no guilt."l 28 The duration of the privilege of
sanctuary in the cities of refuge for manslayers was tied to the death of the
high priest, which was a type of religious redemption or satisfaction for
bloodshed.129
121. MATTHEw HENRY, COMMENTARIES ON THE WHOLE BIBLE, Joshua 20:7-9 (1706), available
at http://www.biblestudytools.com/commentaries/matthew-henry-complete/joshua/20.html.
122. Joshua 20:4 (King James) ("And when he that doth flee unto one of those cities shall
stand at the entering of the gate of the city, and shall declare his cause in the ears of the elders
of that city, they shall take him into the city unto them, and give him a place, that he may
dwell among them.").
123. Joshua 20:2-6; Numbers 35:24-25.
124. See generally, Joshua 20:1-9 (appointing cities of refuge); see also Joshua 21:32,
Kedesh; Joshua 21:21, Shechem; Joshua 21:13, Hebron; Joshua 20:8, Bezer; Joshua 21: 36;
Joshua 21:38, Ramoth; Joshua 21:27, Golan.
125. Henry, supra note 121, at Joshua 20:7-9.
126. RUSHDOONY, supra note 113, at 61.
127. Numbers 35:24 (King James) ("Then the congregation shall judge between the slayer
and the revenger of blood according to these judgments.").
128. RUSHDOONY, supra note 113, at 58.
129. Numbers 35:25 (King James) ("and he shall abide in it unto the death of the high
priest, which was anointed with the holy oil"). See also, MATTHEw HENRY, COMMENTARY ON
THE WHOLE BIBLE, Numbers 35 (1706), available at http://www.biblestudytools.com/
commentaries/matthew-henry-complete/numbers/35.html ("The cities of refuge being all of
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The sanctuary afforded in the cities of refuge and at the altar served
complimentary purposes. The laws of God provided the cities of refuge to
protect manslayers from the vengeance of family members, the "avengers of
blood."'o Thus, the cities of refuge were a check on the family and the
family's vigilante justice,"' for biblical law denies to the family the power of
capital punishment.132 King David extended some type of sanctuary
protection to Abner, King Saul's former general, in the city of Hebron,
which was King David's first capital and also a city of refuge in the tribal
lands of Judah.13 However, Joab, David's general, grossly violated biblical
law pertaining to the city of refuge and killed Abner in the gates of Hebron,
thus avenging the blood and death of his brother Asahel, whom Abner
killed lawfully in battle."'
In contrast to the purpose of the cities of refuge, the biblical examples in
which manslayers and murderers took refuge at the altar of sacrifice appear
to have served as checks upon the power of the king, the chief magistrate."'
The priests ensured that murderers would be taken from the altar to the
place of execution. After King Joash's coronation, the high priest Jehoida
specifically denied any protection at the altar for Athaliah, the queen
mother, due to her slaughter of the royal family."' Thus, in practice, the two
types of biblical sanctuaries separated and limited the independent
them Levites' cities, and the high priest being the head of that tribe, and consequently having
a peculiar dominion over these cites, those that were confined to them might properly be
looked upon as his prisoners, and so his death must be their discharge; it was, as it were, at
his suit that the delinquent was imprisoned, and therefore at his death it fell. Actio moritur
cum persona-The suit expires with the party. Anisworth has another notion of it, That as
the high priests, while they lived, by their service and sacrificing made atonement for sin,
wherein they prefigured Christ's satisfaction, so, at their death, those were released that had
been exiled for casual murder, which typified redemption in Israel.").
130. Numbers 35:9-34.
131. Numbers 35:24-27.
132. Genesis 4:14-15; Deuteronomy 21:18-21.
133. 2 Samuel 3:19-22, see Joshua 21:13.
134. 2 Samuel 3:26-39.
135. Exodus 21:12-14; but see I Kings 2:28-29 (finding no protection for murderers); I
Kings 1:49-51 (finding protection if a repentant traitor behaved worthily); see also, I Kings
2:36-46 (establishing boundaries for civil sanctuary).
136. 2 Kings 11:15-16 (King James) ("But Jehoiada the priest commanded the captains of
the hundreds, the officers of the host, and said unto them, Have her forth without the ranges:
and him that followeth her kill with the sword. For the priest had said, Let her not be slain in
the house of the Lord. And they laid hands on her; and she went by the way by the which the
horses came into the king's house: and there was she slain." (emphasis added)).
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jurisdictions of the family, the Church or religious order, and the State. The
early Church then took these models from the laws of God and served as a
city of refuge through its early sanctuary laws. The privilege of sanctuary
then passed into Roman law through the Code of Theodosius in 399 and
later through the Justinian Code."' These Roman laws and biblical laws and
served as a precedent for the privilege of sanctuary in the English common
law and also later ecclesiastical law.
C. The Privilege of Sanctuary and the Common Law
King Aethelbert's dooms contain the earliest mention of sanctuary or
"church-frith" in England around the year 600.138 Aethelbert's dooms
provided fines or restitution for violation of church-frith, which is defined
variously as "a special protection under ecclesiastical auspices," or church-
peace. 3 9 In the late 800's, the dooms of King Alfred the Great provided the
privilege of sanctuary in any church or monastery for any crime, for up to
seven days. 40 In England, the right of asylum was originally confined to just
church buildings. In time, the privilege sanctuary was extended to the
church grounds, and at times to even larger areas."' Some sanctuaries
extended protection in a radius of one mile from the church building; the
outer limits of the sanctuary were marked by sanctuary crosses.42 At
common law, there were two types of sanctuary-church sanctuary and
sanctuaries chartered by the king.'43 These sanctuary laws existed in one
form or another for over 1,000 years in England.'
137. Alston, supra note 107.
138. MEDIEVAL SOURCEBOOK: THE ANGLO-SAXON DooMs, 560-975, available at
http://www.fordham.edu/Halsall/source/560-975dooms.asp#The Laws of )Ethelberht (citing
OLIVER J. THATCHER, IV THE LIBRARY OF ORIGINAL SOURCES 211-239 (1901)); see also
RUSHDOONY, supra note 113, at 60 ("[W]here, as early as King Ethelbert in 600 A.D.[,]
sanctuary was recognized.").
139. Id. See also Carro, supra note 117, at 753 ("the penalty for disturbing church peace
was double that of an ordinary breach of the king's peace.").
140. MEDIEVAL SOURCEBOOK: THE ANGLO-SAXON DooMs, supra note 138.
141. Alston, supra note 107.
142. Id.
143. Carro, supra note 117, at 754.
144. See id. at 753 (Ethelbert's dooms); id. at 766 (King James I abolishes sanctuary).
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Blackstone noted that "[a]nd now ... all privilege of sanctuary ... is
utterly taken away and abolished."' Feeley observed that, "[a]s the years
passed and centralized governmental control increased, Church and State
clashed over control of sanctuaries and the scope of ecclesiastic power.
Church and State bitterly disputed from which authority the right of
sanctuary of a given place derived."'" As a side effect of Henry VIII's
divorce from Rome, the privilege of sanctuary commenced a fairly rapid
decline during the post-Reformation era.'47 Henry VIII limited the privilege
of sanctuary for repeat offenders; for those accused of high treason; for
murderers, rapists, burglars, highway robbers, arsonists; and those guilty of
sacrilege."' Moreover, Henry VIII's statutes required all sanctuary persons
to wear badges, prohibited them from carrying weapons, and kept them
under curfew while upon sanctuary grounds."'
James I abolished town sanctuaries in 1603 and abolished the last general
church sanctuary in 1623.5' Whitefriars in London was the last English
sanctuary and was abolished by act of Parliament in 1697."' In continental
Europe, the privilege of sanctuary lasted until the eighteenth century.152 In
Scotland, "sanctuary was abolished at the Reformation, with one exception.
Debtors could take refuge at Holyrood House and its precincts" for a
limited time."' This conditional asylum continued through the nineteenth
century."' The State's abolition of the privilege of sanctuary is also reflected
in the Canon Law. Professor Jorge Carro noted that "[t]he 1983 Code [of
Canon Law] dropped its previous statement that '[a] church enjoys the right
of asylum so that weak criminals who flee to it are not to be removed from
145. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *333. ("And now, by the statute 21 Jac. I. c.
28. all privilege of fanduary, and abjuration confequent thereupon, is utterly taken away and
abolifhed.").
146. Feeley, supra note 106, at 810.
147. Carro, supra note 117, at 766.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Alston, supra note 107.
152. Id.
153. RuSHDOONY, supra note 113, at 60 (citing R.S. Peale, Sanctuary, XXI ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 255 (1891)).
154. Id.
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it, except in case of necessity, without the assent of the ordinary or the
rector of the church."""
Thus, because the State abolished the privilege of sanctuary, "the modern
state is an increasingly oppressive tyranny. Only as the church becomes the
voice of God's law and a sanctuary against injustice can the power of the
current tyranny be broken. There are now no cities of refuge."'16 Indeed, men
now have no refuge from the State's lawlessness and the vigilante justice of
the family, for the Church's power to serve as a government check and the
voice of God's law has been severely limited by the State.
D. The Rise of Statist Sanctuaries: A Check on the Church
The concept of sanctuary, however, has not been abolished. The concept
and ideals endure in one form or another. Though colonial America did not
recognize the right of sanctuary, Feeley noted that the founding of the New
World embodied the concept and ideals of sanctuary, for early colonists
"often viewed their piece of North America as promised land, as the new
Israel, as sanctuary from their persecutors."' Thus, the question is not
whether there will be sanctuary; but which type of sanctuary will there be,
for "[n]ames change not the nature of things."' The privilege of sanctuary
is inescapable: Humanity has always valued special, sacred places and
created specific legal and spiritual protections for those places.
Today, sanctuary endures almost exclusively as a statist privilege. Like
the royal grants of sanctuary long ago, the modern State either creates or
controls virtually all sanctuaries.' The privilege of sanctuary is thus alive
and well, but as a statist privilege; it consists at least in part of "laws
forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings."'60 Justice Scalia made it clear that "nothing in our
[Heller] opinion should... cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions of
155. Carro, supra note 117, at 767 (quoting Hennesey, Right of Sanctuary-Then and
Now, in AMERICA 482 (1971)).
156. RUSHDOONY, supra note 113, at 61 (emphasis added).
157. Feeley, supra note 106, at 811.
158. David Jones, Defensive War in a Just Cause Sinless (1775), reprinted in THE
THEOLOGY OF CHRISTIAN RESISTANCE: CHRISTIANITY AND CIVILIZATION, 218-32, 225 (1983).
159. King Solomon recognized, "there is no new thing under the sun. Is there any thing
whereof it may be said, See, this is new? It hath been already of old time, which was before
us." Ecclesiastes 1:9-10 (King James).
160. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570,626 (2008) (emphasis added).
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firearms in such sensitive places."16' With such weapon laws aimed at the
Church, the State implicitly denies that the Church has an independent
right and jurisdiction to control the sanctuaries of the Church.
Feeley recognized, "If the State grants the privilege of sanctuary, it can
also regulate and revoke it. However, if the sanctuary privilege flows from
the independent and separate power of the Church, the State may not control
it."' 62 Sanctuary exists today, and, as in the past, sanctuary is "the peace and
protection of the central authority .. . granted by the [state] to specially
favored places." 6 3 Sanctuary exists today, "extended by the power of the
State to those places favored by the [state]."" Like royal chartered
sanctuaries long ago, the State's modern "sanctuaries [are] often churches
or religious establishments."' 61 Statutes forbidding firearms in the Church
contain the three elements Feeley suggested govern ecclesiastical sanctuary:
person, place, and government check. However, the elements are inverted
and reflect the State's prerogatives. The person is the minister of the State,
confronting the representative of the Church and, at least in theory,
confronting lawless criminals who target the Church. The place is a church
sanctuary defined, not by the Church's authority but by the State, as a
"sensitive area." The government check refers in part to the State's check
upon lawless criminals, but also functions as the State's check upon the
Church's jurisdiction. The similarities between both ecclesiastical sanctuary
and royal chartered sanctuary on one hand and modern "sensitive place"
weapon laws on the other are striking.1" These weapon laws mean that
"sensitive places," much like ecclesiastical sanctuaries, may not be profaned
by the use of force, let alone the peaceful carrying of weapons for self-
defense. In the District of Columbia, if a person illegally carries a weapon in
a gun-free zone, both the applicable fine and/or prison term may be
doubled,'16  much like King Aethelbert's double penalty for violating the
"Church-Frith" 1,400 years ago.'16 In the United States, as in some of the old
161. Id.
162. Feeley, supra note 106, at 810 (emphasis added).
163. Carro, supra note 117, at 754.
164. See Feeley, supra note 106, at 809.
165. Id.
166. Modern "sensitive places" weapons laws are not trivial matters, but result in the
disarmament of the Church, which is a serious matter indeed.
167. D.C. STAT. ANN. § 22-4502.01(b) (West, Westlaw through Oct. 16, 2013).
168. Carro, supra note 117, at 753 ("[T]he penalty for disturbing church peace was
double that of an ordinary breach of the king's peace.").
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English sanctuaries, the "privilege of sanctuary" extends in a radius up to
1,000 feet around certain "sensitive areas."'6' The only external feature that
has changed is that the signs denoting areas as "gun-free school zones" have
replaced the old sanctuary crosses that marked the limits of the sanctuary.
Indeed, King Henry VIII's statutory limitations on sanctuaries bear striking
similarities to laws regulating "sensitive areas."' Concealed/carry licensees
must, as "sanctuary persons" in "sensitive areas," "wear badges," also known
as concealed-carry licenses, and be "prohibited ... from carrying weapons"
in certain areas, known as "sensitive areas."'
Thus, the State abolished ecclesiastical sanctuary years ago, only to
replace the Church's sanctuary with statist sanctuaries, called "sensitive
places." The State's "sensitive place" weapon laws are problematic on at least
three levels. First, these laws are a usurpation of the jurisdiction of the
Church. The Church inherited the biblical duty to serve as a city of refuge, a
sanctuary against both the State's lawlessness and personal vengeance. After
stripping the Church of its ancient sanctuaries, the State has no jurisdiction
to create sanctuaries on behalf of the Church. Many aspects of the privilege
of sanctuary should be revived by the Church, not usurped by the State.
Second, the State does not do the greatest job of providing true sanctuary.
Statistically, the State's "sensitive places" have provided only limited
protection; the amount of violent incidents in the Church and other
religious locations has risen noticeably since 1999, and risen sharply since
2004.172 Legally, weapon laws defining the Church as a "sensitive area" offer
only tenuous sanctuary. What the State grants, it can also revoke: "If the
State grants the privilege of sanctuary, it can also regulate and revoke it.""'
In contrast, if the privilege flows from the Church's independent
jurisdiction, the State may not eliminate it. Third, the State's "sensitive
places" cannot serve as a true government check, for the State, without
reference to God's higher law, has no self-limiting or self-checking principle
to check its own power. The State's sanctuaries do not check its own power
but consolidate power, unless checked by the Church and the family.
"Sensitive place" weapon laws truly invert the ideals of the privilege of
169. D.C. STAT. ANN. § 22-4502.01(a)-(b); 11 Del. Code Ann. § 1457 (c)(1) (West 2012).
170. Carro, supra note 117, at 766.
171. Id.
172. Carl Chinn, Ministry Violence Statistics, available at http://www.carlchinn.com/
ChurchSecurityConcepts.html.
173. Feeley, supra note 106, at 810 (emphasis added).
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sanctuary: the minister of State passing laws for the sensitive place serves as
a government check on the Church or the family through these weapon laws.
To remedy the state's usurpation of the Church's jurisdiction over the
sanctuary, this Article proposes that the doctrines of church autonomy and
the principles of the privilege of sanctuary must be applied by the Church to
state weapon laws aimed at the Church. The Church must reassert its
jurisdiction over the sanctuary, and the representatives of the Church must,
in the place of the Church's sanctuaries, serve as a government check upon
the State's attempts to control the Church.
V. SOLUTION: APPLY CHURCH AUTONOMY TO WEAPON LAWS
AIMED AT CHURCHES
A. Jurisdiction over the Sanctuary Generally
The Church has jurisdiction over its own sanctuaries, and must be free to
guard its own sanctuaries from the State's regulation and interference.
Feeley acknowledged that the privilege of sanctuary is an independent right;
it is a matter of church autonomy. It involves "an assertion of an
independent right, premised on natural and divine power, to prevent
imminent harm to whomever the Church chooses to grant protection."1 1 4 In
biblical times, the priests and Levites confronted both the family's avengers
of blood and the power of the civil magistrate with sanctuary in cities of
refuge and at the altar. The Church later confronted the royal state with the
privilege of sanctuary. In modern times, the Church must continue to
confront the secular democratic state's attempts to usurp the Church's
jurisdiction, but also continue to confront lawless criminals who would
destroy the peace of the Church and the lives of God's people. The Church
still has a duty to grant protection to people who come to its sanctuaries, in
short, to be a sanctuary.
As the Church has an independent right to prevent imminent harm to
those under its protection, the State has no jurisdiction to protect those who
seek the Church for sanctuary. At common law, this privilege meant there
were sanctuary places where the King's writ did not run. In modern terms,
this means there are jurisdictional limitations upon the State's police power
to regulate and disarm the Church through weapon laws. The State lacks
the jurisdiction to disarm church leaders and church members who could
prevent imminent harm to the Church and church members. Conversely,
174. Id. (emphasis added).
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this also means the Church has the jurisdictional right to guard its
sanctuaries and ban weapons therein, if a local church chooses to do so.
However, the State may not make these decisions for the Church and
usurps the jurisdiction of the Church when it does.
Thus, a jurisdictional defense to weapon laws aimed at the Church may
be raised using the elements of the privilege of sanctuary."' The Church has
an independent right and autonomous jurisdiction over specific places, its
sanctuaries. The representatives of the Church must act consistently upon
the Church's jurisdiction and reject the State's usurpations and attempts to
control the sanctuary through its weapon laws, thus serving as a government
check. The Church must confront the State through an appeal to God's law.
If the Church does not act upon its autonomous jurisdiction, the Church
has no chance of employing a jurisdictional defense to weapon laws aimed
at the Church. The Church's jurisdiction means little unless it is confirmed
by faithful, responsible action taken by church government.
B. Jurisdiction over Who Enters the Sanctuary
Because the Church has jurisdiction over the sanctuary, the Church
necessarily has jurisdiction over who enters and does not enter the Church's
sanctuaries. The Church, not the state, has the "keys of the kingdom of
heaven,""' and thus has Christ's authority to open and shut the doors of
Christ's Church on earth."' This authority to decide who enters the Church
is a necessary corollary to the power of excommunication, which belongs to
the Church, not the state.178 The Church's authority extends to shutting the
Church's doors to Christians who remain unrepentant fornicators, coveters,
idolaters, adulterers, drunkards, and extortioners, etc., so that the Church
175. This article does not argue for a full-scale return to the common-law and
ecclesiastical privilege of sanctuary. This article contends that apart from reviving that
ancient privilege, the key common-law and biblical principles of the privilege remain viable
and should be applied by the Church today against the State's weapon laws aimed at the
Church.
176. Matthew 16:19 (King James); see Westminster Confession of Faith, XXX(1) (Rev. ed.
1960).
177. Westminster Confession of Faith, XXX(2) (Rev. ed. 1960) ("To these officers the keys
of the kingdom of heaven are committed, by virtue whereof, they have power respectively to
retain, and remit sins, to shut that kingdom against the impenitent, both by the word and
censures; and to open it unto penitent sinners, by the ministry of the gospel, and by
absolution from censures, as occasion shall require." (emphasis added)).
178. See Matthew 18:15-20; 1 Corinthians 5:1-7.
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puts "away from among [themselves] that wicked person."'" The Scripture
does not permit the Church to shut its doors to those who bear arms in
church. Bearing arms in the church is not (of itself) a sin subject to Church
censure or excommunication. Because the State has no authority to
excommunicate anyone from Christ's Church, as a corollary, the State acts
beyond its lawful authority when it shuts the doors to the Church by
requiring men to disarm themselves before entering a church, or certain
portions of a church.
Instead, the Church has the jurisdiction to bar the door to fellowship for
those who would carry a weapon in the church only to kill and destroy the
people of God. The Church also has the jurisdiction to bar certain parts of
church grounds from general admission, such as a parochial or church
school, daycare or childcare center, and other ministries under the Church's
protection. However, the Church's door to fellowship with Christ must be
open as wide as the call to repentance and faith in Jesus Christ, which goes
out to all men,'" Jews and Gentiles, armed and unarmed.'' The prophets
Micah and Isaiah spoke of the days when many people from all nations will
flow up to the Lord's house, to learn the ways and laws of God and walk in
His paths.'82 The prophets describe this sequence. First, God's law goes
forth; second, God judges and rebukes the nations; and last, the nations
forge their weapons into farming tools, with the result that "nation shall not
lift up a sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more. "1
Weapon laws aimed at the Church reverse and attack this biblical pattern
of national discipleship and evangelism. Such weapon laws require that men
of entire states be disarmed before going to the house of the Lord. The
prophets, in contrast, taught that many people of entire nations-as
opposed to the individuals in the nations-would disarm themselves after
God's law went forth, and after God judged their nations. Thus it is that the
Church, not the State, has the jurisdiction to decide who may enter the
doors of the Church's sanctuaries. The Church, not the State, has the
jurisdiction to decide when to require men to lay down their warlike
179. 1 Corinthians 5:11-13 (King James).
180. See Acts 17:30 (King James) ("but [God] now commandeth all men every where to
repent."); Matthew 28:19 (King James) ("Go ye therefore and teach all nations.").
181. Luke 3:14 (Soldiers repenting at John the Baptist's preaching); Luke 22:38 (King
James) ("And they said, Lord, behold, here are two swords. And he said unto them, it is
enough.").
182. See Isaiah 2:1-4; Micah 4:1-4.
183. Micah 4:3 (King James).
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weapons-whether before coming to Christ, outside the house of God, or
after the nations come to Christ, as a result of the declaration of God's laws.
C. Jurisdiction to Plan for Armed Defense of the Sanctuary
Because the Church has the jurisdictional right to guard its own
sanctuaries, the Church must act and create a specific plan for armed
congregational defense. This means the local Church leaders must act and
determine matters of church security as part of their regular church
government. Pastors, priests, elders, and deacons have a biblical duty to
guard their sanctuaries and protect the flock of God, the Church. Pastors
who prepare specific plans to defend the Church and to protect the flock
emulate Christ, the Good Shepherd:
"I am the door of the sheep. All that ever came before me are
thieves and robbers: but the sheep did not hear them.... The
thief cometh not, but for to steal, and to kill, and to destroy: I am
come that they might have life, and that they might have it more
abundantly. I am the good shepherd: the good shepherd giveth his
life for the sheep. But he that is an hireling and not the shepherd,
whose own the sheep are not, seeth the wolf coming, and leaveth
the sheep, and fleeth: and the wolf catcheth them, and scattereth
the sheep.... I lay down my lfe for the sheep.""'
Christ, the Good Shepherd lays down his life for his sheep. Moreover, there
are specific biblical examples of religious leaders preparing for necessary
self-defense. Ahimelech, the priest at the city of Nob, kept Goliath's sword
stored with the priest's ephod."' Jehoida, the high priest, deputized captains
from the tribes to serve as temple guards by the altar during King Joash's
coronation. Jehoida's temple guard was armed with King David's spears and
shields."' Pastors today likewise have a duty to guard, protect and defend
the sheep, rather than refusing to defend them or rendering them
defenseless by banning weapons in the Church apart from the State. Not
acting in the area of Church safety is the same as disarming one's own
church members. This is pastoral abdication of the flock to the wolves, who
seem quite content to devour and murder the flock.
184. John 10:7-8, 10-12, 15 (King James) (emphasis added).
185. 1 Samuel 21:8-9.
186. 2 Kings 11:10-11.
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There are a growing number of resources available to help the Church
and church leaders guard and defend the flock of God. To that end, Pastor
Jimmy Meeks has authored a short essay called "Protecting the Flock" in
which he outlines the basic Scriptural principles about pastors defending
the flock of God. 8 1 On the legal side of these issues, the Alliance Defending
Freedom has provided the Church with excellent, easily accessible resources
both on church safety and on church autonomy."" Opaque Security is an
international security company that offers churches security training.'
SafeAtChurch.org has also organized Church Safety Seminars at various
locations in the United States.'90 Sheepdog Seminars Group hosts Sheepdog
Seminars for Churches, which are "multi-day seminars detailing how to stay
safe at church and to effectively respond to violent events."'
Thus, the leaders of the Church must act and determine matters of
church security as part of their regular church government decisions. If the
Church does not act upon its own autonomous jurisdiction, the Church has
no chance of employing a jurisdictional defense to the application of
weapon laws aimed at the Church. The Church's leaders must act upon the
Church's jurisdiction, take responsibility in these areas as a matter of
church government, and guard the flock of God.
D. Jurisdiction over Firearms Storage in the Sanctuary
Because the Church has jurisdiction over the sanctuary, the Church also
has jurisdiction over decisions regarding firearms storage in the church.
Georgia's carry law contains express directives for what religious leaders
must do if the local church allows concealed weapons to be carried to the
sanctuary, not in the sanctuary.'92 Church security or management must
give explicit directions for "removing, securing, storing, or temporarily
surrendering such weapon or long gun."' Georgia's carry law gives church
leaders no discretion to allow firearms to be carried concealed in the
187. Rev. Jimmy Meeks, Protecting the Flock, available at http://www.safeatchurch.org/
protect-the-flock.html.
188. SPEAK UP MOVEMENT, available at http://www.speakupmovement.org/church/
LearnMore/Details/3767.
189. OPAQUE SECURITY, available at http://opaquesecurity.com/.
190. SAFEATCHURCH.ORG, available at http://www.safeatchurch.org/church-safety-
seminars.html.
191. SHEEPDOG SEMINARS INTERNATIONAL, available at http://sheepdogseminars.com/.
192. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(d)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
193. Id.
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church.' The First Amendment protects the Church from this type of state
control. The First Amendment guarantees the Church's "independence
from secular control or manipulation" and reserves the "power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as
well as those of faith and doctrine.""' "[T]he First Amendment 'permit [s]
.. . religious organizations to establish their own rules and regulations for
internal ... government."""
The decision of whether to require concealed weapons to be removed,
secured, stored, or surrendered is an internal polity matter to be decided by
regular church government, who may determine whether firearms should
be stored or surrendered upon arrival. To be sure, the decision to explicitly
require that firearms to be stored, surrendered, or relinquished upon arrival
at church may be prudent in certain cases. In other cases, however, the
decision may be utterly foolish. In either case, the State violates the
jurisdiction of the Church by giving specific directives for church leaders
concerning how they must manage and store weapons that are brought to
the sanctuary of a local church."' The Church's jurisdictional right to
decide matters pertaining to firearm storage must be free from this type of
meddling by the State.
194. Additionally: what should the Church's leaders do with the weapon once the
weapon is removed, secured, stored, or surrendered? Georgia's statute logically requires a
church to have some type of armory, locker, or safe for holding the temporarily surrendered
or relinquished weapons - unless a church adopts a policy of turning away anyone that
arrives with a concealed weapon.
195. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in N. Am., 344 U.S.
94, 116 (1952) (emphasis added).
196. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. E.E.O.C., 132 S. Ct. 694, 705
(2012) (emphasis added).
197. See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(d)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.) In
contrast to Georgia's statute, if a person bearing a firearm arrived at a West Virginia church,
the church might allow the possession of the weapon, or might request the person to
relinquish the firearm temporarily. See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-7-14 (West, Westlaw
through 2013 1st Extraordinary Sess.). West Virginia's statute, however, does not require any
particular action by church leadership. See id. If a state legislature feels compelled to craft a
weapons law that applies to churches, West Virginia's statute has much to commend it. The
West Virginia statute leaves these decisions to the church as the property owner and to the
person carrying a firearm to church, thus honoring the jurisdiction of the Church, the First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause, and the Second Amendment. See id. "Any person
carrying or possessing a firearm or other deadly weapon on the property of another" has the
option of (1) temporarily relinquishing possession of the firearm upon being requested to do
so or (2) leaving the premises. Id.
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E. Jurisdiction over Weapons Training for the Sanctuary
Because the Church has jurisdiction over its sanctuaries and over any
plans for armed congregational defense, the Church also has jurisdiction
over internal decisions regarding any firearms training. Louisiana's carry
law violates the Church's jurisdiction in this regard. If a Louisiana church
permits a church member to carry a concealed weapon in the sanctuary,
Louisiana's carry law requires that the church member receive eight hours
of tactical training annually."' Louisiana's concealed-carry weapons
training requirements aimed at the Church are unique among the states.
Like Georgia's carry law that requires the Church to store surrendered
weapons on a temporary basis, Louisiana's statute may be wise as a practical
matter-in some cases. However, the practical wisdom of a statute does not
somehow invest the State with jurisdiction over the Church. The decision to
require annual tactical training is a decision properly left to church
leadership as an internal decision of church government, not to the state
government.
F. Jurisdiction over Congregational Notice About Weapons Decisions
The Church has jurisdiction over the decision to notify the congregation
that certain church members or leaders are authorized to carry concealed
weapons. Louisiana's carry law blatantly interferes with the Church's
jurisdiction to decide, as an internal church government matter, whether
the particular congregation should know if certain members of the church
are authorized to carry weapons.199 In some local churches, such an
announcement would likely startle no one. In other churches, it would be
foolishness for church leaders to authorize concealed-carry for a few souls
and inform the congregation of this decision.200 Congregational notice of
the decision to authorize concealed-carry in a local church is a decision that
must remain under the jurisdiction of the Church.
G. Jurisdiction to Reject Statist Usurpations upon the Church
Because the Church has jurisdiction over the sanctuary, the state does
not have overlapping jurisdiction over the Church's sanctuaries, absent a
198. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(U)(5) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
199. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 40:1379.3(U) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
200. The author notes that when he received permission from church leadership to carry
a concealed weapon, he was requested not to inform the congregation. Such a request would
be illegal in Louisiana.
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true criminal offense.201' This means the Church must reject statist
usurpations upon the Church's jurisdictional right to determine matters of
church security through regular church government. Thus, at a minimum,
the Church should be highly cautious about developing church security
plans at the behest of state or federal government. Applying a biblical
metaphor, the Church has no need to "sharpen our weapons" in an enemy
camp as the Philistines required the disarmed Israelites to do during King
Saul's reign.202 The White House, however, not wanting to miss an
opportunity to offer guidance to the Church, released Guide for Developing
High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Houses of Worship in June
2013. The guide includes ten pages on "Active Shooter Situations."2 03 The
guidebook encourages churches to plan internal weapons policies: "Each
house of worship should determine, as part of its planning process, policies
on the control and presence of weapons, as permitted by law."204
This statement is inaccurate. The Church's determination of the "policies
on the control and presence of weapons" is not just a "planning process."
The Church's determination of policies on the control and presence of
weapons will unavoidably be a matter of church government and internal
church polity, making the Church's planning process one over which the
State has no jurisdiction to even make recommendations.
While the White House guide may contain some good principles,
neither the national government nor state governments have the
jurisdiction or the constitutional authority to offer emergency operation
201. This article assumes that weapon laws are not criminal laws; they are public safety
regulations that might be consistent with the State's general "police-power" to regulate in
areas of health, safety, welfare, and morals. However, such "police-power" regulations are
invalid, for they offend the independent jurisdiction of the Church and also abrogate the
Church's private property rights to regulate the presence of weapons.
202. 1 Samuel 13:19-22 (King James) ("Now there was no smith found throughout all the
land of Israel: for the Philistines said, Lest the Hebrews make them swords or spears: But all
the Israelites went down to the Philistines, to sharpen every man his share, and his coulter,
and his axe, and his mattock. Yet they had a file for the mattocks, and for the coulters, and
for the forks, and for the axes, and to sharpen the goads. So it came to pass in the day of
battle, that there was neither sword nor spear found in the hand of any of the people that
were with Saul and Jonathan: but with Saul and with Jonathan his son was there found.").
203. Guide for Developing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Houses of
Worship, 23-32, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/developing-
eops-for-houses-ofworshipjfinaLpdf.
204. Id. at 30.
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plans for the Church.205 The White House simply has no jurisdiction to
even recommend that church congregants and staff who face an "active
shooter situation" should "run, hide, or fight."2 06 This is only after the
guidebook first suggests, "If neither running nor hiding is a safe option, as
a last resort, when confronted by the shooter, adults in immediate danger
should consider trying to disrupt or incapacitate the shooter by using
aggressive force and items in their environment, such as fire extinguishers
or chairs."207
Well over 350 years ago, Rev. Samuel Rutherford provided a biblical and
legal explanation of the "run, hide, fight" principles, as applied to the
Church. He explained that flight, or "run and hide," is a lawful means of
self-defense for a private individual, but not a lawful means to self-defense
for a whole church consisting of women, the aged, nursing children, the sick
and diseased:
Now a private man may fly, and and [sic] that is his second
necessity; and violent re-offending is the third mean of self-
preservation; but, with leave, violent re-offending is necessary to
a private man, when his second mean, to wit, flight, is not
possible, and cannot attain the end, as in the case of David: if
flight do not prevail, Goliath's sword and an host of armed men
are lawful. So, to a church and a community of protestants, men,
women, aged, sucking children, sick, and diseased, who are
pressed either to be killed or forsake religion and Jesus Christ,
flight is not the second mean, nor a mean at all, because not
possible, and therefore not a natural mean of preservation; for
the aged, the sick, [and] sucking infants, and sound religion in
the posterity cannot flee; flight here is physically, and by nature's
necessity, impossible, and therefore no lawful mean.... I see not
how natural defense [sic] can put us to flee, even all protestants
205. See M'culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) ("This government is acknowledged
by all, to be one of enumerated powers."). Offering guidance on church security is not one of
the federal government's enumerated powers given to the executive branch. Even if it could
somehow be an implied power under the "necessary and proper" clause (Art. 1, Sec. 8,
Clause 10, U.S. Constitution) that power would run afoul of the First Amendment.
206. Guide for Develoopoing High-Quality Emergency Operations Plans for Houses of
Worship, supra note 203, at 29.
207. Id. at 30 (emphasis added).
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and their seed, and the weak and the sick, whom we are obliged
to defend as ourselves, both by the law of nature and grace.20 s
Likewise, today, when a whole church community "are pressed ... to be
killed," in an "active shooter situation," flight may be impossible for the
"women, aged, sucking children, sick, and diseased." Because flight is
physically impossible for such weaker church members, flight (run and
hide) is also morally impermissible for church leaders and the stronger
members. "An host of armed men are lawful," for "we are obliged to defend
[them] as ourselves, both by the law of nature and grace." Thus, when
preparing for the possibility of an active shooter situation, church leaders-
who are obliged to defend their flock-should modify the White House's
slogan: "RunI Hide Fight."
The Church does not need such slogans; the Church comes well
equipped with aphorisms that advise men how to deal with violent and
dangerous situations. "Watch ye, stand fast in the faith, quit you like men,
be strong."209 "[B] e of good courage, and let us play the men for our people,
and for the cities of our God: and the LORD do that which seemeth him
good."210 "[B]e not ye afraid of them: remember the Lord, which is great and
terrible, and fight for your brethren, your sons, and your daughters, your
wives."211 David's words concerning Goliath are appropriate: "[W]ho is this
uncircumcised Philistine, that he should defy the armies of the living
God?"212 "The sword of the LORD, and of Gideon!"213 The Church must
reject the State's usurpations and recommendations about Church safety as
attacks on the Church's jurisdictional right to determine matters of church
security through internal church polity. The Church has no need to rely
upon the arm of the State in this or any area.
This Article now turns from the above jurisdictional proposals to
consider the plausibility of a constitutional challenge to weapon laws aimed
at the Church.
208. SAMUEL RUTHERFORD, LEx, REX, OR THE LAW AND THE PRINCE 160 (1644). Rutherford
states that the first means a private man may defend himself is by supplication and apologies;
the second by flight; and the third by "violent re-offending," or the use of "Goliath's sword." Id.
209. 1 Corinthians 16:13 (King James) (emphasis added).
210. 2 Samuel 10:12 (King James) (emphasis added).
211. Nehemiah 4:14 (King James) (emphasis added).
212. 1 Samuel 17:26 (King James).
213. Judges 7:18, 20 (King James).
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VI. SOLUTION: A CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO WEAPON LAWS
AIMED AT CHURCHES
A. The Baptist Tabernacle's Misfired Challenge to Georgia's Statute
There is a scarcity of recent cases that address weapon laws aimed at the
Church from a First Amendment and Second Amendment context.2 14 The
2012 GeorgiaCarry.Org v. Georgia215 decision involving the Baptist
Tabernacle of Thomaston, Georgia is one. The Baptist Tabernacle's
plaintiffs in GeorgiaCarry.Org brought both First Amendment and Second
Amendment challenges to Georgia's concealed-carry statute.216  The
plaintiffs alleged that Georgia's statute "interferes with the free exercise of
religion by Plaintiffs by prohibiting them from engaging in activities in a
place of worship when those activities are permitted throughout the
state."21 7 After some analysis, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
concluded that the Baptist Tabernacle plaintiffs failed "to state a Free
Exercise Clause challenge because Plaintiffs omit any factual matter
showing how the Carry Law burdens a sincerely held religious belief."2 18
The GeorgiaCarry. Org court reasoned:
At various points, Plaintiffs allege that they would like to carry a
handgun in a place of worship for the protection either of
themselves, their family, their flock, or other members of the
Tabernacle. Plaintiffs conclude by alleging that the Carry Law
interferes with their free exercise of religion by prohibiting them
from engaging in activities in a place of worship when those
activities are generally permitted throughout the State. That
Plaintiffs "would like" to carry a firearm in order to be able to act
in "self-defense" is a personal preference, motivated by a secular
purpose. As we note supra, there is no First Amendment
214. See generally, FIREARMS LAW DESKBOOK § 1:4 (2012) (surveying post-Heller
decisions).
215. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir. 2012).
216. Id. at 1249. Plaintiffs alleged "in their Amended Complaint that they regularly
attend religious services, possess a weapons carry license, and 'would like to carry a handgun'
while in a place of worship." Id.
217. Id. at 1253.
218. Id. at 1255.
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protection for personal preferences; nor is there protection for
secular beliefs.219
The GeorgiaCarry.Org court concluded, "conclusory allegations that the
Carry Law interferes with Plaintiffs' free exercise of religion are not
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. Their Free Exercise claim is not
plausible and the District Court correctly dismissed it."220
As to the Second Amendment challenge to Georgia's carry law, the
Baptist Tabernacle "Plaintiffs allege[d] that '[the Carry Law] infringes on
the rights of Plaintiffs to keep and bear arms, in violation of the Second
Amendment, by prohibiting them from possessing weapons in a place of
worship."' 22' The court made the following assumptions:
Plaintiffs must argue that the individual right protected by the
Second Amendment, in light of Heller and McDonald, trumps a
private property owner's right to exclusively control who, and
under what circumstances, is allowed on his or her own
premises. In short, we read Plaintiffs' claim to assume the
following: management of a place of worship is likely to bar
license holders from carrying an unsecured firearm on the
premises; the license holders are unlikely to comply with
management's instructions; management is likely to report such
conduct to law enforcement; the license holders are likely to be
arrested by for [sic] their refusal to comply with management's
instructions; and the arrest establishes a Second Amendment
violation.222
The court then considered whether "the restricted activity is protected by
the Second Amendment in the first place."223 The court focused on the fact
that "a place of worship is private property, not public property," alluded to
the importance of the historical background of private property rights, and
then sought to "identify the scope of any pre-existing right to bear arms on
the private property of another."22 4 However, the court did not attempt to
identify the scope of the pre-existing right to bear arms in the Church. The
court concluded that
219. id. at 1258.
220. Id. at 1259 (citation omitted).
221. Id. at 1260.
222. Id. at 1261 (footnote omitted).
223. Id. at 1260 n.34.
224. Id. at 1261.
2014] 693
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
[T]he Second Amendment does not include protection for a
right to carry a firearm in a place of worship against the owner's
wishes.... A place of worship's right, rooted in the common law,
to forbid possession of firearms on its property is entirely
consistent with the Second Amendment. 225
... We conclude that the Second Amendment does not give an
individual a right to carry a firearm on a place of worship's
premises against the owner's wishes because such right did not
pre-exist the Amendment's adoption.226
The GeorgiaCarry.Org decision sets up the problem for this part of this
Article: are Second Amendment and First Amendment Free Exercise claims
against weapon laws aimed at the Church even plausible? Many would say
such claims, as in GeorgiaCarry.Org, would not survive a motion to dismiss.
After all, hasn't Justice Scalia stated in Heller that "the right secured by the
Second Amendment is not unlimited"?227 Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court took pains to assure the reader the Court would not "cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on ... laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in
sensitive places such as schools and government buildings ...."2 2 8
Such claims are plausible. Weapon laws regulating "sensitive places" are
only "presumptively lawful regulatory measures."229 Weapon laws aimed at
the Church retain only a presumption of legality-until the Church and
churchgoers act to pull down the presumption of lawfulness. Weapon laws
aimed at the Church are susceptible to a constitutional challenge under
both the Second Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence
under the First Amendment.
B. A Second Amendment Challenge to Weapon Laws Aimed at Churches
The Second Amendment reads, "A well regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed."23 o The United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Second Amendment greatly improved with the case of
225. Id. at 1264.
226. Id. at 1266.
227. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
228. Id. at 626.
229. Id. at 627 n.26.
230. U.S. CONsT. amend. II.
[Vol. 8:653694
TAKE YOUR GUNS TO CHURCH
District of Columbia v. Heller'" and also changed, for better or for worse, in
McDonald v. City of Chicago,232 which applied the Second Amendment to
the states through the "incorporation" doctrine.233 In Heller, the majority of
the Court rejected an "interest-balancing" approach in holding that the
right to keep and bear arms was an individual right:
We know of no other enumerated constitutional right whose
core protection has been subjected to a freestanding "interest-
balancing" approach. The very enumeration of the right takes
out of the hands of government-even the Third Branch of
Government-the power to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether the right is really worth insisting upon. A constitutional
guarantee subject to future judges' assessments of its usefulness is
no constitutional guarantee at all. Constitutional rights are
enshrined with the scope they were understood to have when the
people adopted them, whether or not future legislatures or (yes)
even future judges think that scope too broad.'
Instead of an interest-balancing test, Heller declared that:
"The Constitution was written to be understood by the voters; its
words and phrases were used in their normal and ordinary as
distinguished from technical meaning." Normal meaning may of
course include an idiomatic meaning, but it excludes secret or
technical meanings that would not have been known to ordinary
citizens in the founding generation.235
To determine the meaning of the Second Amendment, Heller looked to the
plain text and the relevant history of the founding era." 6 The Church and
churchgoers must use Heller's framework as a model for challenging
weapon laws aimed at the Church, as explained below.
First, the plain text Second Amendment provides that the right of the
people to keep and bear arms "shall not be infringed." The meaning of the
last clause is clear, to those readers unencumbered by three years of law
231. Heller, 554 U.S. at 570.
232. McDonald v. City of Chicago, Ill., 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
233. See id. at 3026 (holding that the Second Amendment fully applies to the states).
234. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35 (emphasis added).
235. Id. at 576-77 (quoting United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716, 731 (1931)).
236. Id. at 579-92.
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school and decades of interest-balancing jurisprudence.2 37 The Georgia
Supreme Court, as quoted in Heller, provided a helpful amplification of the
clause "shall not be infringed:"
"The right of the whole people, old and young, men, women
and boys, and not militia only, to keep and bear arms of every
description, and not such merely as are used by the militia, shall
not be infringed, curtailed, or broken in upon, in the smallest
degree; and all this for the important end to be attained: the
rearing up and qualifying a well-regulated militia, so vitally
necessary to the security of a free State. Our opinion is, that any
law, State or Federal, is repugnant to the Constitution, and
void, which contravenes this right, originally belonging to our
forefathers, trampled under foot by Charles I. and his two
wicked sons and successors, re-established by the revolution of
1688, conveyed to this land of liberty by the colonists, and
finally incorporated conspicuously in our own Magna
Charta!"238
Weapon laws aimed at the Church infringe, curtail, contravene, and break in
upon the rights of the people to bear arms in the church sanctuary. These
statutes infringe this right by, among other things, requiring church
members to obtain concealed-carry licenses before bearing arms in the
church; regulating the manner church-members may bear arms at
church-as with concealed-carry bans in the church or in church ministries
such as daycares, childcares, and schools; regulating tactical training-as
with Louisiana's carry law; regulating the storage of weapons at church-as
with Georgia's carry law; and completely barring weapons at church-as
with North Dakota's law.
Second, as to the history of the founding era, Heller contains a passing
reference to Georgia's 1770 statute that required men to bear arms in
church.239 The GeorgiaCarry.Org court also acknowledged in passing that
237. In fact, Black's Law Dictionary does not even define the word "infringed" in a
Second Amendment context. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 796-97 (8th ed. 2004) (defining
"infringement" only with reference to patent law).
238. Heller, 554 U.S. at 612-13 (quoting Nunn v. State, 1 Ga. 243, 251 (1846)) (emphasis
altered).
239. Id. at 601(referencing "the 1770 Georgia law that 'for the security and defence of this
province from internal dangers and insurrections' required those men who qualified for
militia duty individually 'to carry fire arms' 'to places of public worship'") (quoting
COLONIAL RECORDS OF THE STATE OF GEORGIA, supra note 4, at 137-39).
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"certain colonies, including Georgia, enacted laws requiring the possession
of firearms in a place of worship at one point or another."240 However, the
GeorgiaCarry. Org court reasoned that,
Based on the language of Georgia's statute, the primary
motivation for requiring attendance at a place of worship with a
firearm was likely a practical one; that is, the colonial
government identified a time when much of the community
would be gathered in one location-each Sunday at a place of
worship for services-to ensure that individuals both possessed
the equipment necessary for defense and kept it in a state of
readiness should their services be called upon to defend the
community against an internal or external threat.2 4 1
The court completely overlooked the obvious impact of these "public
safety" statutes on the scope of the right to bear arms. Heller stands for the
proposition that "[c]onstitutional rights are enshrined with the scope they
were understood to have when the people adopted them."242 Many colonial
Americans bore firearms "each Sunday at a place of worship for services."243
To understand the scope of the right to bear arms, it is necessary to
determine whether the practice of bearing arms in the Church was
widespread throughout the colonies.
Clayton Cranmer's writings on the Second Amendment provide helpful
summaries of colonial laws that required men to bear arms to church.2 4 In
1619, Virginia law "required everyone to attend church on the Sabbath, 'and
all suche as beare armes shall bring their pieces, swords, pouder and
shotte.' 245 In 1643, Connecticut ordered that "'[t]o prevent or withstand
such sudden assaults as may be made by Indeans upon the Sabboth or
lecture dayes, It is Ordered, that one person in every several howse wherein
is any souldear or souldears, shall bring a musket, pystoll or some peece,
240. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc., v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1264 n.42 (11th Cir. 2012).
241. Id.
242. Heller, 554 U.S. at 634-35.
243. GeorgiaCarry.Org, 687 F.3d at 1264 n.42.
244. Clayton Cranmer, Colonial Firearms Regulation, 16 J. ON FIREARMS & PUB. POL'Y
(N.D.) SECOND AMENDMENT FOUND., available at http://www.saf.org/journal/16/
colonialfirearmregulation.pdf.
245. Id. at *7 (quoting PROCEEDINGS OF THE VIRGINIA ASSEMBLY, 1619 reprinted in LYON
GARDINER TYLER, NARRATIVES OF EARLY VIRGINIA, 1606-25 at 273 (1959)).
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with powder and shott to e[a]ch meeting."'246 A 1636 Massachusetts law
required every person above eighteen years of age, with the exception of
magistrates and elders of the churches, to "'come to the publike assemblies
with their muskets, or other peeces fit for servise, furnished with match,
powder, & bullets, upon paine of 12d. for every default."'247 This law-or
the law for Plymouth Planation cited infra-might be part of the
inspiration behind George Henry Broughton's famous 1867 painting,
Pilgrims Going To Church, originally titled The Early Puritans of New
England Going to Church, in which several arms-bearing Pilgrim men escort
the pastor, women, and children to church.
In 1639, Rhode Island ordered that "none shall come to any public
Meeting without his weapon." 248 In 1642, a Maryland law stated, "Noe man
able to bear arms to goe to church or Chappell ... without fixed gunn and 1
Charge at least of powder and Shott."249 A 1641 law for Plymouth Plantation
required "[t]hat every Towneship within this Government do carry a
competent number of pieeces fixd and compleate with powder shott and
swords every Lord's day to the meetings."2 so The law obligated a member of
each household to bring weapons to church during a set time of the year:
"[O]ne of a house from the first of September to the middle of November,
except their be some just & lawfull impedyment."2 1' In 1738, a Virginia
statute required all militiamen to come to church armed, if requested by the
county's militia commander.252 In 1743, South Carolina law required that:
246. Id. at *6 (quoting THE PUBLIC RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF CONNECTICUT, PRIOR TO
THE UNION WITH NEW HAVEN COLONY (Hartford, Conn.: Brown & Parsons ed., 1850), 1:95,
96).
247. Id. at 7* (quoting NATHANIEL B. SHURTLEFF, RECORDS OF THE GOVERNOR AND
COMPANY OF THE MASSACHUSETTS BAY IN NEW ENGLAND (Boston: William White ed., 1853)
1:190).
248. Id. (citing RECORDS OF THE COLONY OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE
PLANTATIONS, IN NEw ENGLAND (John R. Bartlett ed., 1856) 1:94).
249. Id. (quoting ARCHIVES OF MARYLAND (Baltimore: William Hand Browne, ed., 1885)
3:103).
250. Id. (quoting THE COMPACT WITH THE CHARTER AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF NEW
PLYMOUTH 70 (William Brigham ed., 1836)).
251. Id. (quoting THE COMPACT WITH THE CHARTER AND LAWS OF THE COLONY OF NEW
PLYMOUTH at 115).
252. Id. (citing WILLIAM WALLER HENING, THE STATUTES AT LARGE; BEING A COLLECTION
OF ALL THE LAWS OF VIRGINIA, FROM THE FIRST SESSION OF THE LEGISLATURE, IN THE YEAR 1619
at 1:198 (1823)).
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"[E]very white male inhabitant of this Province ... who [are]
liable to bear arms in the militia of this Province ... shall, on any
Sunday or Christmas day in the year, go and resort to any church
or any other public place of divine worship within this Province,
and shall not carry with him a gun or a pair of horse-pistols ...
with at least six charges of gun-powder and ball, and shall not
carry the same into the church or other place of divine worship
as aforesaid" would be fined twenty shillings.253
Without a doubt, these laws constitute an important part of the
historical record about bearing arms in the church prior to 1789. Based
on the colonial laws preceding the adoption of the Second Amendment
that made it a legal duty to bear arms in church, the scope of the legal
right to bear arms extends to the church, the place of divine worship. To
maintain that the scope of the right to bear arms did not extend to the
church makes no sense; colonial Americans bore arms in the church on
a regular basis and were expected to do so. Early Americans gathered in
one location and had a right to bear arms in that specific location-the
church, each Sunday.
Heller's no-nonsense approach to the Second Amendment offers a
roadmap for future Second Amendment litigation that is faithful to both the
text of the Constitution and the history of our country. When the Church
and churchgoers seek to challenge weapon statutes that infringe the pre-
existing right to bear arms in the Church, a well-researched and well-
prepared Second Amendment claim based on Heller should be sufficient to
demolish arguments in favor of such a weapon statute-that is, if the trial
court and appellate court does not bow to the balancing tests.
C. A Free Exercise Challenge to Weapon Laws Aimed at Churches
While weapon laws aimed at the Church are susceptible to a Second
Amendment challenge under Heller, such laws are also susceptible to a First
Amendment Free Exercise challenge under the United States Supreme
Court's jurisprudential "balancing tests"-which Heller rejected, with good
reason, because "[a] constitutional guarantee subject to future judges'
assessments of its usefulness [with an interest-balancing test] is no
253. Id. (quoting STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 7:417 (David J. McCord ed.,
1840)).
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constitutional guarantee at all."2 54 Nonetheless, one who brings a First
Amendment challenge to weapon laws aimed at the Church must realize
that many judges assume that judicial opinions based on interest-balancing
tests, rather than the text of the Constitution, are the law of the land. But the
law and the judicial opinions based on balancing tests are not equivalents.
Blackstone explained that "the law, and the opinion of the judge, are not
always convertible terms, or one and the same thing; since it sometimes
may happen, that the judge may mistake the law. Upon the whole, however,
we may take it as a general rule, 'that the decisions of courts of justice are
the evidence of what is common law.' 2 55
Judges have no power to alter the Constitution, but judges may grossly
mistake the law through interest-balancing tests. Because judges make
mistakes with the law and do err, those who challenge weapon laws aimed
at the Church should not endeavor to perpetuate judicial mistakes. Rather,
they should follow Heller's example: advance the claims by standing firmly
on the textual meaning and history of the Constitution. Nonetheless, those
who challenge such laws must realize the practical wisdom of arguing the
case using the Supreme Court's interest-balancing tests. This means
carefully, diligently advancing two legal theories-one based on law, text,
and history, and the other on judicial opinions and interest-balancing. The
first theory is necessary to regain lost ground. The second is necessary to
prove that the case may be won, even with the assumptions of modern
jurisprudence.
Churches and church members who seek to bring a Free Exercise Clause
challenge under the United States Supreme Court's "balancing-test"
jurisprudence25 6 to weapon laws aimed at churches must be prepared to
present specific evidence showing how the law impermissibly burdens your
sincerely held religious belief. Or, alternatively, churches and church
members must be prepared to show that the State has no legitimate
governmental interest in weapon laws aimed at the Church and prove that
the statute in question is not "rationally related" to protect any legitimate
254. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634 (2008). The First Amendment
needs its own "Heller" decision to refocus on the plain text and the history of the
Constitution.
255. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *71.
256. The United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the First Amendment is a
vastly different thing from the original meaning of the First Amendment and how to state a
claim under the original text. Thus, this Article separates the text of the First Amendment
from case precedent supposedly under the First Amendment, much like the Supreme Court
has done with its jurisprudence.
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state interest. The United States Supreme Court explained the typical
burden of proof:
[A] law that is neutral and of general applicability need not be
justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law
has the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious
practice. Neutrality and general applicability are interrelated,
and, as becomes apparent in this case, failure to satisfy one
requirement is a likely indication that the other has not been
satisfied. A law failing to satisfy these requirements must be
justified by a compelling governmental interest and must be
narrowly tailored to advance that interest.257
Thus, under current Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, there are two
available methods of framing a challenge to weapon laws. The first method
places a heavy burden of proof on the plaintiff and a light burden on the
State. If the law in question is a neutral law of general applicability, then
"rational basis scrutiny should be applied, requiring that the plaintiff show
that there is not a legitimate governmental interest or that the law is not
rationally related to protect that interest."258
The second type of Free Exercise challenge-the "compelling interest
test"-places a heavier burden of proof on the State. The Supreme Court
stated:
Although a law targeting religious beliefs as such is never
permissible, if the object of a law is to infringe upon or restrict
practices because of their religious motivation, the law is not
neutral; and it is invalid unless it is justified by a compelling
interest and is narrowly tailored to advance that interest.259
Further, "[a]t a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise Clause
pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious beliefs
or regulates or prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious
reasons."260 "To determine the object of a law, we must begin with its
text[,]" and "[a]part from the text, the effect of a law in its real operation is
257. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-32
(1993) (citation omitted).
258. GerogiaCarry.Org, Inc., v Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1255 n.21 (11th Cir 2012).
259. Church of the Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 533 (citations omitted).
260. Id. at 532.
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strong evidence of its object."2 6' This Article now applies these two
balancing tests to weapon laws aimed at the Church.
D. Rational-Basis Review and the Free Exercise Clause
Under rational-basis review, most weapon laws are facially neutral and
generally applicable to everyone, regardless of religion. Thus, unless a
plaintiff could prove the object of the law is to infringe upon or restrict
practices that are religiously motivated, rational-basis review applies. Under
"rational-basis" review, the Church must show that the State had no
legitimate governmental interest in passing weapon laws aimed at the
Church or prove the law is not rationally related to that legitimate state
interest. The Church should show the State's lack of a legitimate
governmental interest in such weapon laws in at least two ways.
First, the Church must assert that the State has no legitimate
governmental interest in regulating the possession of weapons in the
Church's sanctuaries because the State has no jurisdiction over the Church
and the Church's religious "interests." As James Madison stated:
We maintain therefore that in matters of Religion, no man's
right is abridged by the institution of Civil Society and that
Religion is wholly exempt from its cognizance....
Because Religion be exempt from the authority of the
Society at large, still less can it be subject to that of the Legislative
Body. 262
The Church is wholly exempt from the cognizance or jurisdiction of the
State. Thus, the Church cannot be subject to the legislative authority of the
State in areas of church government and internal church polity regarding
weapons possession and regulation. The other jurisdictional arguments
concerning various weapon laws from Part III, supra, could be employed
here to demonstrate that these matters are Church interests, not State
interests.
Second, the Church must assert that the State has no legitimate
governmental interest in regulating the possession of firearms on the private
property of the Church. Most of the "sensitive areas" where the possession
of firearms is enjoined by concealed-carry statutes are government
buildings, not private buildings. Hudson and Adams opined that:
261. Id. at 533, 535.
262. Madison, supra note 83, at 167 (emphasis added).
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Because places of worship cannot be publically owned, pursuant
to the First Amendment, the [GeorgiaCarry.Org] plaintiffs may
be victorious in their challenge. An included purpose of the Act
was to give private property owners a choice of whether to allow
licensed weapons carry onto their property, but the Act bans guns
on private property recognized as "places of worship." This
inconsistency may prove fatal for that particular provision of the
Act. 263
The GeorgiaCarry.Org court, however, upheld Georgia's carry law against
the Baptist Tabernacle plaintiffs precisely because a church is private
property: "[T]he Second Amendment does not give an individual a right to
carry a firearm on a place of worship's premises [private property] against
the owner's wishes because such right did not pre-exist the Amendment's
adoption."2" Thus, the court maintained that it was upholding the Church's
property rights, even though a church was one of the named plaintiffs
challenging Georgia's carry law. The court did not share Hudson and
Adams' opinion that Georgia's carry law completely banned weapons in
church but did not explain how the law might be construed to lead to that
conclusion.265 Hudson and Adams' view of the Georgia carry law is much
more accurate to the plain text of the statute and also takes account of the
legislative history. Moreover, if the Georgia carry law actually deferred to
the wishes of churches as private property owners, it would say so, like the
part of the law providing that owners of bars may authorize concealed-carry
in their own bar.266
Without question, the State does have a governmental interest in
upholding the rights of local churches as private property owners. However,
the way the State may achieve that governmental interest is by giving the
Church as a private property owner the choice of whether to allow
concealed-carried weapons on the property and not preempting that
decision for the Church. The State has no legitimate governmental interest
263. Hudson & Adams, supra note 27, at 152 (emphasis added).
264. GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1266 (11th Cir 2012).
265. Id. 1261 n.36 ("The plain language of the Carry Law belies any argument that all
firearms are per se prohibited from a place of worship; quite simply, this is not the 'ban' that
Plaintiffs make it out to be.").
266. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-127(6) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.)
(Concealed-carry prohibited "in a bar, unless the owner of the bar permits the carrying of
weapons or long guns by license holders.").
2014] 703
LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
in proscribing or regulating the possession of weapons on private property
belonging to the Church.
E. Strict Scrutiny Review and the Free Exercise Clause
Under the compelling interest or "strict scrutiny" review, most state
weapon laws do not facially discriminate against religion generally, or apply
to some religions and not others. Thus, the text of the statutes usually does
not help divine the "object of the law," apart from the rare statute that only
mentions "churches" and no other house of worship. North Dakota's ban
on weapons in public gatherings applies to "churches or church functions"
only."' A Free Exercise challenge to North Dakota's statute may be
plausible because "public gatherings" are limited to "churches or church
functions," thus selectively disarming churchgoers only. North Dakota's law
leaves persons of other faiths who do not worship in churches free to bear
arms in their public gatherings. Churchgoers in North Dakota may have a
valid Free Exercise challenge to this law that facially applies only to
churches and does not burden other religious faiths. In addition, the plain
text of the Second Amendment prohibits such selective disarmament of
certain groups or subsets of people, as the right to bear arms is held by "the
people," not certain classes or groups of people only.'
In the GeorgiaCarry.Org lawsuit, the Baptist Tabernacle plaintiffs argued
that Georgia's carry law violated the First Amendment because it
267. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 62.1-02-05(1) (West, Westlaw through 2013 Legis. Sess.).
268. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 580-81 (2008) ("[In all six other
provisions of the Constitution that mention 'the people,' the term unambiguously refers to
all members of the political community, not an unspecified subset.... Reading the Second
Amendment as protecting only the right to 'keep and bear Arms' in an organized militia
therefore fits poorly with the operative clause's description of the holder of that right as 'the
people.' We start therefore with a strong presumption that the Second Amendment right is
exercised individually and belongs to all Americans."). This type of selective disarmament
dates in modern history at least to the Stuart monarchs of Scotland and England. The
English Bill of Rights sought to remedy this, in which the English Parliament declared the
rights and liberties of Englishmen because "the late King James the Second . .. did endeavour
(sic) to subvert and extirpate the Protestant religion and the laws and liberties of this
kingdom ... [b]y causing several good subjects being Protestants to be disarmed at the same
time when papists were both armed and employed contrary to law[.]" Parliament declared
"[]as their ancestors in like case have usually done[] for the vindicating and asserting their
ancient rights and liberties ... [t]hat the subjects which are Protestants may have arms for
their defence (sic) suitable to their conditions and as allowed by law[.]" An Act Declaring the
Rights and Liberties of the Subject and Settling the Succession of the Crown, ENGLISH BILL OF
RIGHTS 1689, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/l7th-century/england.asp.
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specifically targeted religion. The plaintiffs argued that attending a place of
worship is religiously motivated conduct, and Georgia's carry law targeted
that religious conduct:
"Government action is not neutral and generally applicable
if it burdens ... religiously motivated conduct but exempts
substantially comparable conduct that is not religiously
motivated." McTernan v. City of York, 564 F. 3d 636, 647 (3rd
Cir. 2009). A law is not generally applicable "if it proscribes
particular conduct only or primarily religiously motivated."
Tenafly Eruv Association v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F. 3d 144,
165 (3d Cir. 2002). While there may be some secular reasons why
a person would go to a place of worship, Georgia cannot
reasonably dispute that going to a place of worship is primarily
religiously motivated, and therefore the challenged Georgia law
is not neutral....
"When a law that burdens religion is not neutral or not of
general application, strict scrutiny applies and the government
action violates the Free Exercise Clause unless it is narrowly
tailored to advance a compelling government interest."
McTernan, 564 F.3d at 647. Georgia cannot possibly articulate a
compelling government interest in burdening religion in this
way. The policy of leaving worshippers defenseless against
aggression or persecution is unconscionable. There can be no
governmental interest in either burdening or favoring religion.
Even if such an interest existed, disarming all who enter a place
of worship, indiscriminately, is not a tailored measure at all, and
certainly is not a narrowly tailored one.269
The Baptist Tabernacle's arguments about Georgia's carry law burdening
religiously motivated conduct did not persuade the court, which held that
the plaintiffs' Free Exercise Clause claim failed because they did not show
"how the Carry Law burdens a sincerely held religious belief."270 Though
the court's analysis did not reach the issue whether Georgia's carry law
burdened religion as the Baptist Tabernacle alleged, future challengers to
such weapon laws need to be prepared to explain that such laws burden
269. Brief for Appellants at 15, GeorgiaCarry.Org v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244 (11th Cir.
2012) (No. 11-10387), available at http://www.georgiacarry.com/state/places-of_worship/
Brief/o2Oofo2OAppellant.pdf.
270. GeorgiaCarryOrg, 687 F.3d at 1255.
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the free exercise of religion. This Article takes up that subject in Part VII,
infra.
Another way to demonstrate that such laws impermissibly burden
religion is to show that the effect of statutes in "real operation" evidences
an impermissible object under the First Amendment. "At a minimum,
the protections of the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue
discriminates against some or all religious beliefs or regulates or
prohibits conduct because it is undertaken for religious reasons."271
Weapon laws aimed at the Church operate to regulate or prohibit
conduct undertaken for religious reasons. These laws prohibit certain
worshippers who cling to their guns and religion from attending
religious worship, thus interfering with their free exercise of religion.
Weapon laws aimed at the Church create a Hobson's choice272 between
two inalienable, natural rights: The right to worship Almighty God and
the right to bear arms in self defense.273 Such weapon laws "force[]
[churchgoers] to choose between following the precepts of [their]
religion and forfeiting [rights], on the one hand, and abandoning one of
the precepts of [their] religion in order to [exercise the right of self
defense], on the other hand."274 One may carry a firearm, or one may
271. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993).
272. One dictionary defines Hobson's choice as: "1: an apparently free choice when there
is no real alternative. 2: the necessity of accepting one of two or more equally objectionable
alternatives." Hobson's Choice, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, available at http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/hobson's%20choice.
273. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404,83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963).
For '[i]f the purpose or effect of a law is to impede the observance of one or all
religions or is to discriminate invidiously between religions, that law is
constitutionally invalid even though the burden may be characterized as being
only indirect.' Braunfeld v. Brown 366 U.S. [599, 607 (1961)]. Here, not only is
it apparent that appellant's declared ineligibility for benefits derives solely from
the practice of her religion, but the pressure upon her to forego that practice is
unmistakable. The ruling forces her to choose between following the precepts
of her religion and forfeiting benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning one of
the precepts of her religion in order to accept work, on the other hand.
Governmental imposition of such a choice puts the same kind of burden upon
the free exercise of religion as would a fine imposed against appellant for her
Saturday worship.
Id. The right to bear arms in self-defense and defense of others is an inalienable right; this
right is the necessary consequence of our inalienable right to life. If one has the inalienable
right to life, one must also have the right to use certain means to defend one's life-like a
Ruger or a Glock.
274. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 404.
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worship God in church. However, one dare not worship God in church
and carry a firearm simultaneously, upon pain of a misdemeanor or a
felony-in some states. The Hobson's choice created by the effect of
such laws operates to burden and prohibit conduct undertaken for
religious reasons and run afoul of the First Amendment.2 75
Thus, weapon laws aimed at the Church are not neutral and generally
applicable because these laws burden the religiously motivated conduct
of attending worship but exempt comparable conduct that is not
motivated by religion, such as bearing a weapon on private property
where large groups gather, such as civic clubs, charitable societies, and
fraternal organizations. A naysayer might respond that the prohibited
conduct is that of carrying weapons in certain enumerated areas, not
specifically barring one's attendance in the church. The fact that the
State enumerates a lengthy list of locations where weapons are banned
still has the effect of regulating or prohibiting conduct undertaken for
religious reasons in the church. However, in order to even state a
plausible First Amendment claim, challengers to such weapon laws must
show the conduct of carrying a weapon into the church is undertaken for
religious reasons, not simply secular reasons, such as personal
preference, machismo, or general self-defense. There are no First
Amendment protections for personal preferences, secular beliefs,
machismo, or general self-defense.276
Thus, under current Supreme Court jurisprudence, a Free Exercise clause
challenge to weapon laws aimed at the Church may be plausible under the
"strict scrutiny" or compelling interest balancing test. The Church and
churchgoers must show that the effect of the law infringes upon and
restricts the right to bears arms in the church and that this conduct of
bearing arms in the church is undertaken for religious reasons. As a
jurisdictional challenge to weapon laws aimed at the Church depends upon
the Church's leadership actually acting upon that autonomous jurisdiction,
so the plausibility of a Free Exercise challenge under current Supreme Court
jurisprudence depends upon one's religious beliefs about armed self-defense
and carrying a weapon in the church.
275. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 532.
276. GeorgiaCarry.Org, 687 F.3d at 1258. Although there are some state constitutional
protections for self-defense, these protections are not constitutionally part of religious
freedoms clauses. See generally, State Gun Laws, NATIONAL RIFLE ASSOCIATION, available at
http://www.nraila.org/gun-laws/state-laws.aspx.
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VII. A BIBLICAL DEFENSE OF ARMED SELF-DEFENSE
A biblical defense of self-defense has already been crafted. Rev. Samuel
Rutherford's classic work Lex, Rex, or The Law and the Prince is a good
place to start.27 7 Lex, Rex is partly subtitled "The Reasons and Causes of the
Most Necessary Defensive Wars of the Kingdom of Scotland." Question
XXXI in Lex, Rex asks, "Whether or no self-defence against any unjust
violence offered to the life, be warranted by God's law, and the law of nature
and nations."2 78 Rutherford explains that a private man may defend himself
first by supplications and apologies, second by flight, and third by armed
self-defense. However, at some times neither supplication nor flight is a
lawful means of defense:
[W]hen ... flight, is not possible, and cannot attain the end, as in
the case of David: if flight do not prevail, Goliath's sword and an
host of armed men are lawful. So, to a church and a community
of protestants, men, women, aged, sucking children, sick, and
diseased, who are pressed either to be killed or forsake religion
and Jesus Christ, flight is not the second mean, nor a mean at all,
because not possible, and therefore not a natural mean of
preservation; for the aged, the sick, and sucking infants, and
sound religion in the posterity cannot flee; flight here is
physically, and by nature's necessity, impossible, and therefore
no lawful mean.... I see not how natural defense [sic] can put us
to flee, even all protestants and their seed, and the weak and the
sick, whom we are obliged to defend as ourselves, both by the law
of nature and grace.279
Rutherford continues:
[F]or the law saith, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." . . .
It is true I am to love the salvation of the church, it cometh
nearer to God's glory, more than my own salvation, as the wishes
of Moses and Paul do prove; and I am to love the salvation of my
brother more than my own temporal life; but I am to love my
own temporal life more than the life of any other, and therefore, I
am rather to kill than be killed, the exigence of necessity so
requiring.... [RIather than the wife or children should be killed;
277. RUTHERFORD, supra note 208.
278. Id. at 159-66.
279. Id. at 160.
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yea, he that his [sic] wanting to his brother, (if a robber unjustly
invade his brother,) and helpeth him not, is a murderer of his
brother, so far God's spiritual law requiring both conservation of
it [life] in our person, and preservation [of it] in others.280
Rutherford explained that private defense is allowable when (1) the violence
is sudden; (2) the violence is manifestly inevitable; (3) the magistrate is
absent and cannot help; and (4) moderation is kept "as the lawyers
require."81 These principles apply to the Church and whole congregations,
as Rutherford makes clear.
For modern primers on this subject, Larry Pratt of the Gun Owners of
America provided a good introduction on what the Bible says about
weapons and gun control.282 A key point Pratt raises is from the Proverbs:
"A righteous man who falters before the wicked is like a murky spring and a
polluted well."283 Pratt explains that "we would be faltering before the
wicked if we chose to be unarmed and unable to resist an assailant who
might be threatening our life. In other words, we have no right to hand over
our life which is a gift from God to the unrighteous."284 In a similar way,
Dave Kopel, in The Torah and Self-Defense, expounded upon the right and
duty to defend oneself and others, as seen in the narrative portions and the
laws of God in the Torah.285
The Bible offers several noted examples of men prepared to exercise self-
defense and defend their families, the weak, and the helpless. God's people
of old were encouraged to "[b]e not ye afraid of them: remember the Lord,
which is great and terrible, and fight for your brethren, your sons, and your
daughters, your wives, and your houses."286 Psalm 94 asks, "Who will rise up
for me against the evildoers? or who will stand up for me against the
workers of iniquity? Unless the LORD had been my help, my soul had
280. Id. at 162-63.
281. Id. at 163.
282. Larry Pratt, What the Bible Says About Gun Control, GUN OWNERS OF AMERICA,
available at http://gunowners.org/fs9902.htm.
283. Id. at *3.
284. Id.
285. David B. Kopel, The Torah and Self-Defense, 109 PENN ST. L. REv. 17 (2004). See also,
DAVID KOPEL, RETURN FIRE: THE MORALS OF SELF-DEFENSE (2004) (Surveying a variety of
faiths and religious texts that support the right of self-defense).
286. Nehemiah 4:14 (King James).
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almost dwelt in silence." 87 Moreover, the priests of Nob kept Goliath's
sword near their priestly vestments:
And David said unto Ahimelech, And is there not here under
thine hand spear or sword? . .. And the priest said, The sword of
Goliath the Philistine, whom thou slewest in the valley of Elah,
behold, it is here wrapped in a cloth behind the ephod: if thou
wilt take that, take it: for there is no other save that here. And
David said, There is none like that; give it me.288
For a concise biblical case for self-defense, the Catholic Catechism offers
a good example of how Christians might justify a sincere religious belief for
the practice of carrying concealed weapons in church. The Catholic
Catechism provides the following teaching about "Legitimate Defense."
The legitimate defense of persons and societies is not an
exception to the prohibition against the murder of the innocent
that constitutes intentional killing. "The act of self-defense can
have a double effect: the preservation of one's own life; and the
killing of the aggressor.... [T]he one is intended, the other is
not."
Love toward oneself remains a fundamental principle of
morality. Therefore it is legitimate to insist on respect for one's
own right to life. Someone who defends his life is not guilty of
murder even if he is forced to deal his aggressor a lethal blow:
If a man in self-defense uses more than necessary
violence, it will be unlawful: whereas if he repels force
with moderation, his defense will be lawful.... Nor is
it necessary for salvation that a man omit the act of
moderate self-defense to avoid killing the other man,
since one is bound to take more care of one's own life
than of another's.
Legitimate defense can be not only a right but a grave duty
for someone responsible for another's life. Preserving the
common good requires rendering the unjust aggressor unable to
inflict harm. To this end, those holding legitimate authority have
287. Psalm 94:16-17 (King James).
288. 1 Samuel 21:8-9 (King James).
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the right to repel by armed force aggressors against the civil
community entrusted to their charge.289
A number of Presbyterian, Calvinist, and Reformed churches subscribe
to the Westminster Standards and could employ the Westminster Larger
Catechism to establish a religious defense of self-defense in the Church. The
Larger Catechism teaches that as part of the duties required in the Sixth
Commandment, Christians are required through "all careful studies, and
lawful endeavors, to preserve the life of ourselves and others, by resisting all
thoughts and purposes, subduing all passions, and avoiding all occasions,
temptations, and practices, which tend to the unjust taking away the life of
any; by just defence thereof against violence ... comforting and succouring
the distressed, and protecting and defending the innocent."290 The
Catechism cited the following Scriptural proofs for some of the above
propositions:
Psalm 82:4. Deliver the poor and needy: rid them out of the hand
of the wicked.
Proverbs 24:11-12. If thou forbear to deliver them that are drawn
unto death, and those that are ready to be slain; If thou sayest,
Behold, we knew it not; doth not he that pondereth the heart
consider it? and he that keepeth thy soul, doth not he know it?
and shall not he render to every man according to his works?
Proverbs 31:8-9. Open thy mouth for the dumb in the cause of all
such as are appointed to destruction. Open thy mouth, judge
righteously, and plead the cause of the poor and needy.29'
In other words, Christians have a religious duty to protect and defend
innocent life from the hands of wicked men; this religious duty requires all
careful studies and lawful endeavors to avoid all occasions and practices
"which tend to the unjust taking away the life of any." Thus, carrying a
concealed weapon in a place of worship may fulfill this religious duty to
protect and defend innocent life-"those that are ready to be slain." This
duty to defend our own lives and others requires careful studies-in other
289. THE CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, §§ 2263-2265 (citing St. Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologicae, II-II, 64, 7, corp. art., available at http://www.vatican.val
archive/ENG0015/_P7Z.HTM#-2BX).
290. Westminster Larger Catechism, Q/A 135 (Rev. ed. 1960).
291. Id. Q/A 136.
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words, regular target practice and tactical weapons training-but not at the
behest of the State.
The Catechism also lists the sins forbidden in the Sixth Commandment
as "all taking away the life of ourselves, or of others, except in case of...
necessary defence; the neglecting or withdrawing the lawful and necessary
means of preservation of life ... and whatsoever else tends to the
destruction of the life of any."29 2 The Catechism cites Jeremiah 48:10, which
says, "Cursed be he that doeth the work of the LORD deceitfully, and cursed
be he that keepeth back his sword from blood."293 The Catechism also
quotes Exodus 22:2, which says, "If a thief be found breaking up, and be
smitten that he die, there shall no blood be shed for him."294 The next verse
continues, "If the sun be risen upon him, there shall be blood shed for him;
for he should make full restitution; if he have nothing, then he shall be sold
for his theft."295
At times, one who keeps his weapon from bloodshed or willfully refuses
to prepare for necessary armed defense incurs God's curse. Samuel Davies,
the renowned orator, educator, Presbyterian evangelist of the First Great
Awakening, and pastor of Patrick Henry, took this view.296 In a 1758
sermon to the militia of Hanover County, Virginia, on the text of Jeremiah
48:10, he said: "This denunciation, like the artillery of heaven, is leveled
against the mean, sneaking coward who, when God, in the course of His
providence, calls him to arms, refuses to obey and consults his own ease and
safety more than his duty to God and his country." 297 Similarly, one breaks
the Sixth Commandment by cowardly neglecting the lawful means of
preservation of life, such as carrying a weapon for self-defense. Carrying a
concealed weapon in the church is certainly a lawful means of preserving
life and guarding against what tends to destroy life-i.e., unanticipated
violence.
292. Id.
293. Jeremiah 48:10 (King James).
294. Exodus 22:2 (King James).
295. Exodus 22:3 (King James).
296. GARY AMos & RICHARD GARDINER, NEVER BEFORE IN HISTORY: AMERICA'S INSPIRED
BIRTH 56 (2011).
297. Samuel Davies, The Curse of Cowardice (1758), in 2 ANNALS OF AMERICA 23-28
(1976). Davies' sermon had its intended effect-so many recruits enlisted that some had to
be turned away. See id. at 23.
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Likewise, today, God's denunciation is leveled against men who, in God's
providence, are called to defend the Church and their families in the church
but refuse this call, instead consulting their own ease and safety.
VIII. CONCLUSION: TAKE YOUR GUNs TO CHURCH
For church leaders: instruct your flock to take their guns to church. The
Church's leaders must reject statist usurpations into the Church's
sanctuaries and create specific, internal plans for armed congregational
defense, which may include directives for firearms storage, tactical training,
and congregational notification, a determination of who enters the
sanctuary, under what terms, and in what manner, and a plan to guard its
sanctuaries from the State's efforts at disarming both church members and
church leadership.
For church members: take your guns to church. First, defend the right of
armed self-defense in the church by developing comprehensive biblical
convictions on this subject. Your life-and the life of your family members
and your brothers and sisters in Christ-may depend upon it. Second,
defend armed self-defense in the church by honoring your church leaders'
decisions and policies regarding weapons in the sanctuary.298 If you cannot
do so, it may be high time to find another church family, one where the
pastors and leaders do not disarm the flock of God and thus make them the
prey of wicked men.2 99 Third, defend armed self-defense in the church with
a no-compromise stand on the text and history of the Second
Amendment-a history which traces the scope of the right to bear arms in
the church to 1619, 12 years after the settlement of Jamestown, one year
before the Pilgrim landing at Plymouth."oo Fourth, you may defend armed
self-defense in the church with an appeal to Free Exercise balancing tests.
298. Though the State does not have jurisdiction over the presence of weapons in the
Church, the Church certainly has jurisdiction over the presence of your weapons in the
sanctuary.
299. Church government has disarmed the flock of God too, but this is an issue beyond
the scope of this Article. This is just as bad as the State disarming the Church. Church
leaders have authority in matters of church security. However, if church leaders misuse their
authority and start behaving like tyrants . . . "surely because my flock became a prey, and my
flock became meat to every beast of the field, because there was no shepherd, neither did my
shepherds search for my flock, but the shepherds fed themselves, and fed not my flock."
Ezekiel 34:8 (King James) (emphasis added).
300. In 1619, Virginia law "required everyone to attend church on the Sabbath, 'and all
suche as beare armes shall bring their pieces, swords, pouder and shotte.'" Cranmer, supra
note 244, at *7.
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However, the argument based on modern jurisprudence must be advanced
along a Heller-type First Amendment claim based on the constitutional text
and history. Finally, first and last, defend the right of armed self-defense in
the Church by developing comprehensive biblical convictions on this
subject, for in certain times, "[a]n appeal to arms and to the God of hosts is
all that is left us!"'o
301. See AMos & GARDINER, supra note 296, at 142 (quoting Patrick Henry's Speech,
Richmond, Virginia, Mar. 23, 1775).
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